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ALLOCATION OF PRIVATE PENSION BENEFITS
AS PROPERTY IN ILLINOIS DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
Peter Bonavich *
In this article, Professor Bonavich argues that private retire-
inent plan benefits should be characterized as property under the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act for purposes of
division upon divorce. In so doing, he examines the provisions of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and perti-
nent Illinois case law.
The recently enacted Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
(IMDMA) 1 raises a number of questions regarding property disposition. One
of the most troublesome involves the particular interests that are to be
treated as marital property. The statute defines "marital property" as "all
property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage," 2 but it
creates an exception for certain classes of property designated as "non-
marital property" based on either their nature or time of their acquisition. 3
It does not, however, define "property," or explain how a court is to decide
whether property was "acquired" during the marriage.
The purpose of this article is to explore the circumstances under which
Illinois courts may find that private pension benefits are marital property
subject to division in marriage dissolution proceedings. The methods that are
available to accomplish the identification, valuation, and allocation of plan
benefits as marital property are analyzed. Finally, the problem of federal
preemption of state law is discussed.
The following questions are relevant to this analysis: (1) Which interests in
private pension benefits qualify for treatment as property? (2) When may
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1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 101-802 (1977).
2. Id. § 503(a).
3. The following are classified as "non-marital property":
(1) property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired befire the marriage or in
exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(3) property acquired by a spouse after a judgment of legal separation;
(4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties;
(5) the increase in value of property acquired before the marriage; and
(6) property acquired before the marriage.
Id. § 503(a)(1)-(6).
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property interests in benefits be found to have been "acquired during the
marriage" so as to constitute marital rather than non-marital property? (3)
What methods should be employed to arrive at a fair valuation of these
interests? (4) What method of allocation should be employed for accomplish-
ing a "just" division of such interests in a marriage dissolution proceeding?
(5) Finally, are Illinois and other state courts precluded by congressional
preemption from reaching private retirement plan benefits in marriage dis-
solution proceedings?
PRIVATE PENSION AND RETIREMENT PLANS
Purposes and Types of Plans
Valuable to both employer and employee, retirement programs were cre-
ated for a variety of reasons. For the employer, some type of plan is desira-
ble to attract, retain, and motivate employees. 4  If the plan qualifies for
favorable tax treatment, other advantages include the deductibility of
employer contributions and, in the case of a plan funded through a proper
trust or custodial account, a tax exemption accorded to income from trust
assets. 5 For the employee, a retirement plan provides security for later
years, a convenient savings method, postponement of taxation on some or all
contributions and the income from them until final disbursement, and cer-
tain tax concessions even after disbursement. 6
Plans are classified in a number of ways. The source of contributions to
plan funds will determine whether it is termed non-contributory (no con-
tributions from employees) or contributory (employees may or must contri-
bute). 7 The manner in which contributions are credited and the manner in
which benefits are determined further delineate certain types of programs.
Two broad types are identified: the defined contribution (or individual ac-
count) plan 8 and the defined benefit plan.9  The former provides for the
4. [1979] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 105.
5. See I.R.C. §§ 404, 501(a), (c). See also Pattiz, In a Divorce or Dissolution Who Gets the
Pension Rights: Domestic Relations Law and Retirement Plans, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 191, 202
n.39 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Pattiz].
6. id.
7. See generally J. MAMORSKY, PENSION AND PROFIT-SHARING PLANS: A BASIC GUIDE
1-37 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MAMORSKY]. There are some differences among types of plans,
especially among defined contribution plans, that may have importance in specific factual situa-
tions. Throughout this article, the term "retirement plans" embraces all pension and profit-
sharing plans, including both defined benefit and defined contribution plans. The term "defined
contribution plan" will include all plans that employ individual accounts for participants.
8. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34)(1976) [here-
inafter cited to 29 U.S.C. § - (1976)]:
The term "individual account plan" or "defined contribution plan" means a pen-
sion plan which provides for an individual account for each participant and for ben-
efits based solely upon the amount contributed to the participant's account, and
any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other
participants which may be allocated to such participant's account.
9. id. § 1002(35):
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maintenance of individual employee accounts to which contributions are
made according to formulas established by the plan. The salient features of
this type of program are the calculation of allocations to individual accounts
according to a plan formula and the use of individual employee accounts. 10
If the formula for employer contributions conditions those contributions on
the existence of profits, the plan is termed a profit-sharing plan. If the con-
tribution is fixed without reference to profits, the program is termed either a
money-purchase plan or a target-benefit plan." Benefits ultimately paid in
defined contribution or individual account plans depend on the periodic allo-
cations made to individual accounts and the income experience of the plan
funds. 12
Alternatively, a defined benefit plan employs a formula to compute the
benefit that will accrue to employees. Contributions are then made in an
amount that actuaries calculate will yield the promised benefits. 13 The
benefits payable are usually based on years of service, some measure of
average compensation, or both. 14 Defined benefit plan contributions, like
those made under a money-purchase plan, are not dependent on profits. 15
In this type of program the benefit is stated; it is the contributions that must
be determined by the administrators, and contributions are the amounts ac-
tuarially determined as necessary to fund the promised benefit. In a defined
contribution plan, the contributions are fixed by the plan, but the amount of
benefits remains unknown. 16 Of course, employers may maintain more
than one type of program. 17
IMDMA and Retirement Plans
Pension and retirement plans are economically significant. The volume of
assets held for the purpose of guaranteeing retirement income has increased
The term "'defined benefit plan" means a pension plan other than an individual
account plan; except that a pension plan which is not an individual account plan and
which provides a benefit derived from employer contributions which is based partly
on the balance of the separate account of a participant-
(A) for the purposes of section 1052 of this title, shall be treated as an individual
account plan, and
(B) for the purposes 'of paragraph (23) of this section and section 1054 of this title,
shall be treated as an individual account plan to the extent benefits are based upon
the separate account of a participant and as a defined benefit plan with respect to
the remaining portion of benefits under the plan.
10. Id. See ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (IICLE), PENSION
PRACTICE 3.10, at 3-7 (1978) [hereinafter cited as IICLE PENSION PRACTICE].
11. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(i) (1978).
12. See [19771 PENS. & PROFIT-SHARING (P-H) 5104. See also IICLE PENSION PRACTICE,
supra note 10, 3.21, at 3-11, 3-12.
13. See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(i) (1978); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1976).
14. MAMORSKY, supra note 7, at 6-10.
15. IICLE PENSION PRACTICE, supra note 10, 3.14, at 3-9.
16. Id. See also [1977] PENS. & PROFIT-SHARING (P-H) 5104.
17. See I.R.C. § 410 (limitations on plan combinations).
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dramatically in the last thirty years. Non-insured private pension and re-
tirement plans in 1975 boasted $145 billion in assets. 1s In that same year,
thirty million workers were covered by retirement plans. 19 (In 1950, private
plans held about $12 billion in assets and covered about ten million work-
ers.) 20  For many families, the right to receive retirement benefits may con-
stitute the principal, if not the only, substantial family asset. 21
Pension and retirement plans create in employees interests that vary
greatly in certainty of realization and in amount of control given to the
employee. Nonetheless, it is submitted that this range of interests sweeps
into its scope some interests that deserve the label "property." 22
If it is determined that pension plans create property and that an
employee's interest has been acquired during the marriage, the court in a
proceeding under IMDMA must determine how a just division of this prop-
erty is to be accomplished. IMDMA contains a number of provisions that are
relevant to these problems. The Act broadens the category of property for
which record title is not controlling by creating a broad category of "marital
property" that is subject to division regardless of how title is held. 23
Further, by mandating a "just" division of marital property, the Act imposes
restraints upon judicial discretion in property division.24 In making this
division, the court is required to consider "all relevant factors," including
ten that are enumerated. 25
18. Pattiz, supra note 5, at 202 n. 3 9.
19. Id.
20. Comment, The Relation of Community Property and Forced Heirship to Employee Re-
tirement Plans, 51 TuL. L. REv. 645, 645 n.2. (1977).
21. See Thiede, The Community Property Interests of the Non-Employee Spouse in Private
Employee Retirement Benefits, 9 U.S.F.L. REV. 635 (1975),
22. See notes 78-101 and accompanying text infra. Retirement plans commonly include "an-
cillary" benefits, which are principally disability and death benefits.
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a) (1977).
24. Id. § 503(c).
25. Id. These factors are:
(1) the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation,
or depreciation or appreciation in value, of the marital and non-marital property,
including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit;
(2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) the duration of the marriage;
(4) the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse whens the division of
property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family
home, or the right to live therein for reasonable periods, to the spouse having
custody of the children;
(5) any obligations and rights arising from a prior marriage of either party;
(6) any antenuptial agreement of the parties;
(7) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational
skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties;
(8) the custodial provisions for any children;
(9) whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance; and
(10) the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of capital
assets and income.
[Vol. 29:1
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Further, following the structure of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act
(UMDA), 26 from which it is largely derived, IMDMA erects a two-stage test
for the award of maintenance (formerly alimony), which appears designed to
constrict the court's discretion in making such awards. 27 The court is per-
mitted to enter a maintenance order only if it finds that a spouse satisfies
certain need-oriented criteria. 28 If that crucial threshold test is passed, the
amount and duration of the award is then left to judicial discretion that is to
be guided by traditional alimony standards. 29 Worthy of note is IMDMA's
mandate that a just division of marital property take into consideration
whether the award is "in lieu of or in addition to maintenance."
3 0
Finally, IMDMA permits the court to provide for minor, dependent, or
incompetent children of a dissolving marriage by "setting aside a portion of
the jointly or separately held estates of the parties in a separate fund or
trust."31 The difficulty of satisfying IMDMA's maintenance criteria,
coupled with the comparative flexibility of the criteria for division of marital
property, will induce many spouses to seek a share of pension benefits as
Id. The concept of special equities in property, expanded to include the contributions of a
spouse as homemaker, is only one of the ten criteria listed. Formerly, in contrast, it was the
sole non-record-title determinant of spousal property rights. Id. § 503(c)(1).
26. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (9 U.L.A.) § 308 (minor grammatical changes
1973).
27. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 504(a) (1977):
[T]he court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse, only if it finds that
the spouse seeking maintenance:
(1) lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to
provide for his [or her] reasonable needs, and
(2) is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is the custo-
dian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custo-
dian not be required to seek employment outside the home, or
(3) is otherwise without sufficient income.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 504(b):
The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods of time as
the court deems just, without regard to marital misconduct, after consideration of
all relevant factors, including:
(1) the financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital
property apportioned to him and his ability to meet his needs independently, in-
cluding the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party
includes a sum for that party as custodian;
(2) the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the
party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;
(3) the standard of living established during the marriage;
(4) the duration of the marriage;
(5) the age and the physical and emotional condition of both parties; and
(6) the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs
while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.
30. Id. § 503(c)(9).
31. Id. § 503(d).
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part of a property division rather than as funds available for maintenance.
Moreover, vigorous protection of children's interests frequently will include
an attempt to reach pension benefits as part of the "estates of parties." 3 2
The determination of whether plan interests are property must turn in
large measure on a close examination of the precise interest held in a re-
tirement plan, and on the court's position as to the legal status of the par-
ticular plan. This inquiry necessarily involves a close scrutiny of the actual
terms of the plan. Those terms in turn are pervasively influenced today by
the Employees' Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).33
ERISA and Property
The specific interests arising from retirement plan terms have been largely
created by ERISA. 34  ERISA is silent as to whether plan interests constitute
"property." It seems certain, however, that some or all of the interests cre-
ated by plans complying with ERISA should be regarded as property for
purposes of marriage dissolution proceedings. 35
Several salient features of ERISA deserve brief summary here. ERISA
imposes minimum standards for vesting of "accrued benefits" 36 in the pri-
vate pension plans covered by its regulatory provisions. 37 Further, in order
to qualify for favorable tax treatment, plans also must comply with ERISA
tax qualification provisions, which are essentially identical with those appli-
cable to plans covered by the regulatory provisions. 38
32. See id. § 506 (permitting the court to appoint an attorney for a minor or dependent
child).
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976). With some exceptions, the regulatory provisions of
ERISA cover private pension plans ("employee benefit plans") that are established or main-
tained: "(1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting com-
merce; or (2) by any employee organization or organizations representing employees engaged in
commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce; or (3) by both." Id. § 1003(a).
ERISA's regulatory provisions do not apply to a plan if it is a governmental plan as defined by
id. § 1002(32); a church plan as defined by id. § 1002(33); a plan maintained solely to comply
with Workmen's Compensation, unemployment compensation, or disability insurance laws; a
plan maintained outside the United States primarily for nonresident aliens; or an excess benefit
plan, as defined by id. § 1002(36). See id. § 1003(b).
34. ERISA operates as a regulatory statute, requiring the inclusion of specified terms in
many commerce-affecting plan contracts. See id. § 1001-1144 (1976). It also operates to impose
parallel requirements on plans that seek to qualify for tax advantages. See Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, tit. II, §§ 2001-2008, 88 Stat. 829, 831.
35. See notes 36-46 and accompanying text infra.
36. The term "'accrued benefit" is defined:
(A) in the case of a defined benefit plan, [as] the individual's accrued benefit de-
termined under the plan and, except as provided in section 1054(c)(3) of this title,
expressed in the form of an annual benefit commencing at normal retirement age,
or
(B) in the case of a plan which is an individual account plan, [as] the balance of the
individual's account.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(23) (1976). See notes 8-9 supra.
37. See note 33 supra.
38. See note 34 supra.
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One of ERISA's most important innovations is the requirement that
specified percentages of contributions and benefits that have "accrued" dur-
ing employment become-except under a limited set of circumstances-
"vested" or "nonforfeitable" prior to retirement. 39 Under pre-ERISA law, it
was possible for a plan to postpone until retirement the vesting of the
employee's right eventually to receive a benefit derived from employer con-
tributions.4 0 Thus, it was possible for a retirement plan to make the "vest-
ing" requirement (certain eventual payment) identical with the maturity re-
quirement (immediate entitlement). Vesting and maturity therefore coin-
cided in time, both occurring only when the employee reached retirement.4 1
Under ERISA, vesting is distinguished from maturity. Employee contri-
butions must be 100% vested as they are made, 42 while employer contribu-
tions must vest according to one of three minimum schedules. 43  ERISA
also requires that, for defined benefit plans, plan benefits must "accrue" or
be earned at a rate that satisfies specified criteria . 4 4  The overall impact of
these requirements is to guarantee that after even relatively short periods of
employment, many covered employees will be "entitled" to the eventual
receipt of benefits. Those benefits will not necessarily, however, be mature.
Their payment is certain but need not be immediate. 45
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1051-1053 (1976).
40. [1979] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 3000. In enacting ERISA, Congress found that "de-
spite the enormous growth in such plans many employees with long years of employment are
losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting provisions in such plans .
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976).
41. [1979] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 3000.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(1) (1) (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-l(a)(2) (1978).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)(2).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (1976); I.R.C. § 411(b).
45. ERISA does not render vested (used in ERISA synonymously with "nonforfeitable")
benefits wholly immune from forfeiture. The term "nonforfeitable" refers to a
claim obtained by a participant or his beneficiary to that part of an immediate or
deferred benefit under a pension plan which arises from the participant's service,
which is unconditional, and which is legally enforceable against the plan. For pur-
poses of this paragraph, a right to an accrued benefit derived from employer con-
tributions shall not be treated as forfeitable merely because the plan contains a
provision described in section 1053(a)(3)....
29 U.S.C. § 1002(19) (1976). Further, the Act permits non-payment of benefits derived from
employer contributions (1) to an employee who dies prior to payout, except in the case of a
survivor annuity, 29 U.S.C. §1053(a)(3)(A) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)(3)(A); (2) in certain situations
where suspension is permitted because of competing post-maturity employment or post-
maturity employment by the same employer, 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(B) (1976); I.R.C.
§ 411(a)(3)(B); (3) where a plan amendment is allowed limited retroactive application, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1053(a)(3)(C) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)(3)(C); or (4) in certain limited circumstances involving with-
drawal of mandatory employee contributions, 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(D) (1976); I.R.C. § 411
(a)(3)(D). These exceptions to the certainty of eventual receipt of vested contributions are
noteworthy primarily because of their narrowness. The death-prior-to-payout exception is
blunted by its own exception for survivor annuities. For plans providing for benefits in the
forms of annuities, that exception leaves the certainty of eventual payment in the hands of the
employee.
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In sum, ERISA distinguished certainty of payment from immediacy of
payment. This Act also requires plans to specify a rate of accrual of benefits
that may be called "earning" benefits. There are three categories of interests
to he considered: (1) benefits that are earned (accrued) but neither vested
nor mature; (2) benefits that are earned and vested but not mature; and (3)
benefits that are earned, vested, and mature. 46  To gain a perspective on
the changes wrought by ERISA, and to develop an understanding of the case
law doctrines that are relevant to identification of interests in ERISA plans
as property, the evolution of Illinois case law addressing the status of plans
and their benefits will be examined.
Pension Plans in Illinois Outside of Divorce Context
Illinois cases dealing with retirement plan rights outside the divorce con-
text have involved employer-employee disputes over the employee's right to
receive benefit payments or the return of contributions. (All decisions con-
strued pre-ERISA plans.) They uniformly have turned on a close construc-
tion of and strict adherence to the terms of the document setting up the
retirement plan.
In Umshler v. Umshler,4 7 the plan provided for sole discretion in the
employer to terminate the employee's right to receive a pension. Under
those circumstances, the court held, the plan was a mere gratuity and con-
ferred no enforceable right on the employee that could be asserted by a
spouse in an action for sequestration.48 The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, in Hurd v. Illinois Bell Telephone
Co., 49 applying Illinois law, construed a plan that by its terms guaranteed
the payment of a pension to all employees who satisfied certain eligibility
requirements. 50 This program, according to the court, was a unilateral con-
tract. 51 Under its terms, an employee could obtain a legally enforceable
right to the pension only by satisfying all the terms and conditions im-
46. For the definition of "accrued benefit," see note 36 supra.
47. 332 11. App. 494, 76 N.E.2d 231 (1st Dist. 1947). In Uinshler, the plaintiff sued her
husband for separate maintenance and sued his former employer, the Illinois Central Railroad,
to sequester certain pension benefits. Id. at 495, 76 N.E.2d at 231. Because the dispute was
solely with the employer, the case is treated as being outside the context of a divorce dispute.
The court held: "In our opinion the benefits provided for in the pension plan of defendant
railroad company are clearly gratuities." Id. at 498, 76 N.E.2d at 233. See Hughes v. Ency-
clopedia Britannica, 1 111. App. 2d 514, 117 N.E.2d 880 (1st Dist. 1947) (non-contributory pension
plan did not give rise to an enforceable unilateral contract).
48. 332 II1. App. at 498, 76 N.E.2d at 233.
49. 136 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1955), affid, 234 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1956). Here, employees
brought a class action to test Illinois Bell's practice of offsetting federal old age insurance
benefits against company pensions.
50. See 136 F. Supp. at 129.
51. Id. at 134. The court stated: "The instrument upon which the litigation turns is, as both
parties admit, a unilateral contract to pay a pension ......
[Vol. 29:1
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posed. 52 In Anderson v. Seaton, 53 the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District approved and followed the reasoning of Hurd, which had involved
the same plan. 
54
The Umshler, Hurd, and Anderson cases involved pension plans that were
non-contributory and that postponed vesting until maturity. In other words,
the plans provided that the employee did not contribute to the plan directly
from his or her earnings and enjoyed no certainty (provided by vesting) of
receiving any benefits until the benefits were immediately payable (ma-
tured).55 Maturity and vesting, in the Hurd and Anderson cases, both oc-
curred at retirement. Because the time of vesting coincided with the time of
maturity, it is not surprising that the courts in those cases viewed no right as
having "vested" in the employee until he or she had retired and satisfied all
the requirements imposed by the plan for the payment of benefits. By the
same token, there was no occasion for the courts to decide whether the
certainty of eventual payment (vesting) alone could operate to convert
the plan to something more than a gratuity or an incompletely accepted offer
to form a unilateral contract.
Today, the atmosphere in which pension plans are construed is more hos-
pitable to an employee's claim of entitlement. 56 There is a discernible
trend to treat employees' "rights" somewhat more generously. The charac-
52. Id. at 155.
53. 14 I11. App. 2d 53, 143 N.E.2d 59 (1st Dist. 1957). In this case, the plaintiffs, retired
Illinois Bell employees, sought to have their pension benefits restored to them.
54. Id. at 59, 143 N.E.2d at 62. In so holding, the court affirmed the dismissal of the
plaintiff's complaint.
55. In fact, the Illinois Central plan involved in Unishler provided no certainty of payment
at all even when the interest was "mature." See 332 I11. App. at 494, 76 N.E.2d at 233.
56. E.g., Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1975). In this pre-ERISA case, former
employees of the defendant, who were terminated when the employer closed its plant, brought
an action to recover pension benefits pursuant to employer's retirement plan or under a theory
of quantum meruit. Where there was no evidence that the closing had been in bad faith and
where the plaintiffs' rights under the plan had not vested, their claims were denied. The court,
however, did recognize that non-contributory pension plans no longer are considered gratuities.
It held: "Although private, non-contributory pension plans were once viewed as gratuities ...it
is now generally true that both employers and employees regard pension benefits as a type of
deferred compensation." Id. at 680 (citation omitted). See Genevese v. Martin-Marietta
Corp., 312 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Here, plaintiffs sought return of their pension
contributions under an amended plan covering salaried employees after they joined a union and
became hourly employees. The court denied their claims because it found the amendment to
the plan to be valid. Further, it held that the construction of a plan depends upon the analysis
of its terms, with possibilities ranging from a gratuity to a unilateral contract to a bilateral
contract. Id. at 1190. See also In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1976) (pension benefits are a form of deferred compensation); In re Marriage of
Hunt, 78 I11. App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1st Dist. 1979) (non-vested or profit-sharing in-
terests found to be bargained-for contractual rights to deferred compensation and therefore
property); Musser v. Musser, 70 I11. App. 3d 706, 388 N.E.2d 1289 (4th Dist. 1979) (military
pension pay is earned property right accruing from years of service). But see Lehner v. Crane
Co., 448 F. Supp. 1127 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Illinois law applied to construe plan narrowly as a
unilateral contract).
1979]
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terization of the employee's interest in benefits as a gratuity is giving way to
a recognition that pension plans are more accurately seen as interests flowing
from contracts that provide benefits as deferred compensation for services
performed by the employee. 57 The terms of the plan are still viewed as
controlling on the question of entitlement to the benefits. For that reason,
the Hurd and Anderson discussion of plans as unilateral contracts still may
be persuasive in a particular factual context, although recent Illinois deci-
sions have not relied on either the gratuity or the unilateral contract
rationale. 58 The emerging view is that plan benefits are deferred compensa-
tion, and that the employee's entitlement to them is to be determined by
the terms of the plan document. 59 Two recently decided Illinois cases illus-
trate the importance of the specific provisions of the plan.
In Stevenson v. lI..T.-Harper, Inc., 60 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District refused to require the payment of pension benefits from a plan
because the plaintiff-employee had not complied with the program's eligibil-
ity requirement-he had not retired nor had he reached age sixty-five. The
plan was not subject to ERISA requirements, and thus provided for no vest-
ing prior to maturity. 6' Following the terms of the plan, relief was denied.
The court declined to characterize the plan or its benefits as a gratuity,
unilateral contract, or property, but rather construed it as a contract fixing
the respective rights of the parties. 62
To the contrary, in Anger v. Bende r, 63 the earlier Illinois Appellate Court
for the First District refused to permit a plan administrator to deny, because
of disloyalty to the employer, payment of benefits to a former employee.
The plan, which also was not subject to ERISA requirements, stated that its
57. See Craig v. Bemis Co., 517 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1975), discussed at note 56 supra. Cf.
In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1st Dist. 1979) (benefits for private,
non-vested plans); Musser v. Musser, 70 Ill. App. 3d 706, 388 N.E.2d 1289 (4th Dist. 1979)
(military pension, though under continuing congressional control, is earned property right accru-
ing from years of military service).
58. See Stevenson v. lI..T.-Harper, Inc., 51 I11. App. 3d 568, 366 N.E.2d 561 (1st Dist.
1977) (plaintiff, fired as president of defendant corporation, brought suit for damages alleging
that his pension plan was deferred compensation; court arguably construed the plan as a unilat-
eral contract, but no express language to that effect); Anger v. Bender, 31 111. App. 3d 877, 335
N.E.2d 122 (1st Dist..1975) (court upheld defendant's right to pension benefits despite his being
engaged in selling of trade secrets, which, had he been discovered, would have given employer
cause to divest him of those benefits).
59. Crawford v. Peabody Coal, 34 I11. App. 2d 388, 181 N.E.2d 369 (3d Dist. 1962) (pension
rights unenforceable where no showing of bargained-for consideration); Guinzy v. Curtice
Burns, Inc., 28 I11. App. 2d 398, 401, 327 N.E.2d 284, 286 (5th Dist. 1975) (plaintiff denied
employer contribution because he had not terminated his employment).
60. 51 111. App. 3d 568, 366 N.E.2d 561 (1st Dist. 1977).
61. Id. at 572, 574, 366 N.E.2d at 565, 566.
62. Id. at 571-72, 366 N.E.2d at 566-67.
63. 31 111. App. 3d 877, 335 N.E.2d 122 (1st Dist. 1975).
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purpose was "to reward eligible employees for their loyal and faithful serv-
ice .... -64 The employer contended that this provision could be the basis
for "divestment" of benefits. The court refused to view the clause as au-
thorizing the employer to divest the employee of benefits except according
to the specific terms of the plan, and stated additionally: "Even if the above
statement or purpose involved an issue of interpretation, pension plans are to
be liberally construed in favor of the employee." 65
In addition to Anger's liberal rule of construction, the cases are significant
for two reasons. First, neither characterized as either a gratuity or an in-
complete unilateral contract a retirement plan that provides for the vesting
of contributions under specified conditions. Indeed, the Anger court es-
chewed any such facile characterization. 66 In Anger, the court cited Hurd
(unilateral contract) only for the proposition that the provisions of each par-
ticular plan are controlling. 67 Moreover, a federal district court case,
Genevese v. Martin-Marietta Corp. ,68 was cited with approval in Anger.6 9
The citation is significant; Genevese clearly embraces the view that the
characterization of retirement plan rights depends on the specific terms and
provisions of the plan, and possible characterizations range from "gratuity" to
"bilateral contract," depending on the specific terms involved. 70  Although
after ERISA the "gratuity" characterization of plans seems untenable in any
event, the shift from Stevenson to Anger confirms the breadth if not the
fundamental evolution of the Illinois view of private retirement plan in-
terests.
ERISA has introduced important changes in private plan terms. All plans
covered by that Act, as noted, must specify a formula for the accrual of
benefits, and accrued benefits must vest in compliance with one of ERISA's
vesting schedules. 71 Compliance with ERISA means that in most cases ac-
crual, vesting, maturity, and retirement will not coincide in time. For exam-
ple, an employee hired at age thirty, whose non-contributory deferred ben-
efit plan provides for 100% vesting after ten years of employment, at age
forty has a virtually certain, "vested" entitlement to eventual disbursement
of his or her accrued benefits upon reaching retirement age. Yet, the
employee may have no immediate ("mature") entitlement to anything, even
64. Id. at 880, 335 N.E.2d at 125.
65. Id.
66. "Defendant's rights under the pension trust and profit-sharing plans should be deter-
mined in accord with the provisions of each particular plan." Id.
67. 31 I1l. App. 3d at 880, 335 N.E.2d at 125.
68. 312 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D. Pa. 1969). See note 56 supra.
69. 31 11. App. 3d at 880, 335 N.E.2d at 125. It is cited for the proposition that the plan
terms are controlling. Id.
70. 312 F. Supp. at 1190.
71. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra.
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if he or she resigns or is terminated. This vested but deferred benefit is a
much more certain interest than the illusory benefit conferred by the Urn-
shler 72 plan or the highly conditional benefit of the Hurd-Seaton 73 plans.
Moreover, the funding and accrual requirements of ERISA have resulted in
covered plans bearing little or no resemblance to the Urnshler or Hurd-
Seaton plans. 74 Post-ERISA plans must comply with strict funding requir-
ments, 75 and ERISA imposes strong fiduciary obligations on plan adminis-
trators. 76  These far-reaching changes generally make the Urnshler, Hurd,
Seaton, and Stevenson results presently inapplicable. Plan provisions, how-
ever, continue to enjoy controlling importance, and the court's willingness in
an appropriate case to regard plan interests as an enforceable entitlement
will always be a significant outcome determinant. 77
PLAN INTERESTS AS PROPERTY
To what extent do benefits-mature, vested, or merely accrued-
comport with the Illinois view of "property?" If post-ERISA plans create
employee interests that no longer can be regarded as merely gratuities,
which, if any, plan interests may be regarded as property-marital or non-
marital-under IMDMA?
As an employee moves from his or her initial hiring through year after year
of employment to death, retirement, resignation, or firing, his or her in-
terest in an ERISA-covered pension plan changes. At any given point along
the time axis, the employee's rights under the plan may be described. A
plan complying with ERISA will provide that the employee's rights evolve in
terms of three variables: accrual or "earnedness" of benefits, certainty or
nonforfeitability ("vesting") of benefits, and immediate availability or pay
status (maturity) of benefits. Early in his or her career, the employee will
72. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
73. See notes 49-54 and accompanying text supra.
74. See [1979] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 3301-3305.
75. Id.
76. Id. 5691-5696, 5701-5741. In addition, most plans are required to transfer plan assets
into a trust or to an insurance company for investment. Id. 5694. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a), (b)
(1976).
77. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1976):
(a) A civil action may be brought
(1) by a participant or beneficiary
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of the plan. or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or
the terms of the plan, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii)
to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan ...
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have a right only to have ultimate benefits or, in the case of defined con-
tribution plans, the amount credited to his or her account measured in a way
that is regulated by the plan; 78 the employee will have no guarantee of
eventual payment. Later, he or she will have some benefits that have
vested, i.e., become certain eventually to be paid but whose payment is de-
ferred to retirement or termination. Still later, usually when the employee may
or must retire, he or she will become immediately entitled to payment; the
benefits are then matured or in pay status. 79
It is logically clear that mature plan interests are property. The Illinois
Appellate Court for the Fourth District, for example, recently so held in a
case involving military retirement benefits. 80 The court flatly declared that
military retirement pay is "not a gratuity, but an earned property right
which accrues by reason of the individual's years of military service." '81
Similarly, vested or nonforfeitable plan interests should be regarded as
property. They are virtually certain to be paid eventually, and their value
can be accurately estimated. Most courts that have considered this question
have held that vested interests are property. 82 The most difficult questions
are presented by plan interests that have accrued or been earned but are not
yet vested. Whether they may be treated as property depends on a funla-
mental understanding of the term "property."
Any search for a satisfactory general definition of property underscores the
circular nature of the problem. Most commentators have concluded that an
interest is "property" if courts recognize it as "property." Dean Cribbet
notes: "As a layman you are accustomed to speak of the thing itself as prop-
erty; as a lawyer you must come to realize that property is a concept, sepa-
rate and apart from the thing. Property consists, in fact, of the legal relations
78. See notes 7-9 and accompanying text supra.
79. A distinction exists between an employee whose benefits are in active pay status, i.e.,
are actually being paid periodically to him or her, and one whose benefits are mature but not
being paid, i.e., one whose right to immediate payment is solely under his or her control. That
control may be exercised by retiring, or by making application for payment, depending on the
plan terms. Of course, the employee who may but has not yet retired continues to earn ben-
efits, and those earned benefits will vest according to the plan terms. For most employees in
this position, benefits should be regarded as mature at the moment when they vest.
80. In re Marriage of Musser, 70 II1. App. 3d 706, 388 N.E.2d 1289 (4th Dist. 1979). In
Musser, the husband was presently entitled to a military pension of $6,335.80 per year, as a
result of service from 1956 to 1975. The parties were married while the husband was in the
service, and they divorced after his retirement. In a 2-1 opinion, the court held that the pay-
ments were marital property. Though the pension involved was clearly mature, the decision did
not turn on that consideration. The majority refused to view even the assumed power of Con-
gress to reduce or terminate military retirement pay as a contingency which should prevent the
wife from sharing in the benefits. Id. at 709, 388 N.E.2d at 1292. In dissent, Mr. Justice Trapp
contended that the future benefits were not property. Id. at 712, 388 N.E.2d at 1292.
81. Id. at 709, 388 N.E.2d at 1291.
82. See cases collected in Annot., 94 A.L.R.3d 176 (1979). See also Elliott v. Elliott, __
Minn. __, 274 N.W.2d 75, 77-78 (1978), and cases there collected at - n.8, 277 N.W.2d 77
n.8. See also note 97 infra.
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among people in regard to a thing." 83  Later in the same work, Cribbet,
referring to the situation in which a court declines to grant relief because no
property interest is involved and the court will act only to protect property
rights, declares: "Is not this reasoning in reverse? If the court grants the
protection, it has created a species of property .... If it refuses the remedy
then no property can be said to exist because 'take away laws and property
ceases. 84
The salient point is that property is precisely that which is recognized as
property by courts. Thus, the search for a general definition of property
leads one to inquire into the specific factual elements that either (1) have as
a matter of prior precedent been found to induce judicial protection of an
interest as property or (2) should as a matter of policy induce such recogni-
tion. Given the changes in plan terms wrought by ERISA and the limitations
on spousal property rights imposed by prior Illinois law, the first approach
will yield few applicable Illinois cases. 85
With regard to the second approach, it is submitted that the courts, in
approaching the question of whether plan interests involved in marital dis-
putes are property, should take account of the unique characteristics of di-
vorce proceedings and of modern private pension plan interests. Illinois
courts occasionally have attempted to articulate a general definition of prop-
erty. 86 These definitions have been formulated, however, in factual con-
83. J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 2 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as CRIBBET].
84. CRIBBET, supra note 83, at 5, citing J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION, PRIN-
CIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE, part I, 112 (Dumbut ed., Hildreth trans. 1864). See also id. at v,
q11uotilig R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 192 (1922):
In civilized society men must be able to assume that they nay control, for pur-
poses beneficial to themselves, what they have discovered and appropriated to their
own use, what they' have created by their own labor and what they have acquired
Under the existing social and economic order. This is a jural postulate of civilized
society as we know it. The law of property in the widest sense, including incor-
poreal property and the growing doctrines as to protection of economically advan-
tageous relations, gives effect to the social want or demand formulated in this
postulate.
85. See notes 102-110 and accompanying text infra. See also Hunt v. Hunt, 78 I11. App. 3d
653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (lst Dist. 1979) (non vested plan interests are property). Cf. Pickell v.
Pickell, No. 79-85 (5th Dist. I1l. Sept. 19, 1979). Contra, Gallagher v. Gallagher, No. 74-21867
(Cook County Cir. Ct. Oct. 1, 1979) (pension benefits are not property).
86. See, e.g., Davis v. Attic Club, 56 III. App. 3d 58, 371 N.E.2d 903 (1st Dist. 1977). There
the court said: "[The term 'property' in that clause [of the Illinois Constitution] was consistently
interpreted to involve every interest anyone may have in any and everything which is the
subject of ownership by man, together with the right to freely possess, enjoy, and dispose of the
same." Id. at 58, 371 N.E.2d at 910.
Another recent definition of Illinois property is found in the decision of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Webster v. Redmond, 443 F. Supp. 670
(N.I). Il. 1977):
In Illinois, state law recognizes that the term "property" includes every interest one
mav have in an\ and every, thing that is the subject of ownership by man; it is a
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texts other than those involving marital disputes over pension plan interests.
It is not enough to state a "general" definition of property and ask whether
pension interests conform to the definitional requirements. Such a deductive
approach ignores the special characteristics of both divorce proceedings and
pension plan interests. It also ignores the special policy questions involved
in divorce proceedings.
Divorce courts are accustomed to retaining jurisdiction over their decrees
and exercising a high degree of supervisory power over the immediate par-
ties and even over third parties. It is not uncommon for a decree to require
the performance of specific acts over a long period of time, e.g., a court
might require that a wife retain possession of the marital home for the chil-
dren's minority, and that the home then be sold, with a specified division of
the proceeds. 87 The argument that nonvested or nonmature plan benefits
should not be considered property because they are incapable of immediate
enjoyment, or incapable of precise valuation at a particular time, or uncer-
tain as to availability fails given this typical divorce procedure. There is no
reason to suppose that divorce courts cannot, in particular cases, cope with
those problems through an exercise of their continuing jurisdiction.
Moreover, because of ERISA's accrual requirements, covered plan in-
terests, even though they may not be mature or vested, can be measured.
That is, the time when earned, and a method for measuring their value if
and when they do vest or mature, will be available from the terms of the
plan. '8 This is important for two reasons. First, it means that a court can
point to a specific link among plan assets, accrued benefits, and the
employee's earnings or years of service or both. Second, the court will have
a method for measuring the amount of benefits attributable to the period of
the marriage. Thus, the argument that such interests are not property be-
word of general import which applies to every specie of right and interest capable of
being enjoyed as such and on which it is practicable to base a money value.
1I. at 676.
One other Illinois definiton may offer some guidance. In Harvey Wrecking Co. v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 91 111. App. 2d 449, 235 N.E.2d 385 (1st Dist. 1968), prop-
erty was defined as "a word of the very broadest import, connoting any tangible or intangible
res which might be made the subject of ownership." Id. at 455-56, 235 N.E.2d at 388. Cf.
Hogan v. Bleeker, 29 Ill. 2d 181, 193 N.E.2d 844 (1963) (holding that liens are sufficiently
substantial to be within protection of contract and due process clauses of Illinois and U.S.
Constitutions):
In order to be entitled to constitutional protection. "a right must be a 'vested
right' and must be something more than a mere expectation based upon an antici-
pated continuance of the existing law. It must have become a title, legal or equita-
ble, to the present or future enjoyment of property."
Id. at 188, 193 N.E.2d at 849, quoting People v. Lindheimer, 371 111. 367, 373, 21 N.E.2d 318,
321 (1939).
87. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, No. 78-1720 (Ist Dist. II. Aug. 22, 1979) (proper for
court to require husband to quit-claim home to wife but defer sale of home).
88. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23) (definition of accrued benefit); id. § 10054 (benefit accrual
requirements); I.R.C. § 411(b) (parallel requirements for plans qualifying for tax advantages);
Treas. Reg. 1-411d(b)-I (1978) (detailing requirements of I.R.C. § 411(b)).
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cause their measurement cannot be precise, or because their time of acquisi-
tion cannot be ascertained fails in light of these simple measurement proce-
dures.
Some special economic and personal aspects of the marital relationship
also should be considered. As previously noted, pension rights are for many
families the most substantial single asset acquired by the parties. 89 The
important expectations attached to this asset by both husband and wife can-
not be overstated. They involve, after all, the fundamental belief by both
spouses that their mutual security in later years will be protected by pension
benefits. They also involve an assumption of interdependence and wealth-
sharing that has almost certainly been held jointly by both husband and wife
during their years of marriage. As between the two spouses, it would seem
unfair to deny to one of them the security and the sharing that both assumed
would occur, at least where there are available adequate and fair judicial
tools for measuring, valuing, and allocating the interests involved. Moreover,
it must be noted that the contributions made to the plan represent economic
benefits foregone, either directly or indirectly, by both spouses.
One of the "underlying purposes" of IMDMA, as stated in the Act, is to
"mitigate the potential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the
process of legal dissolution of Imarriage." 90 This purpose would be well-
served by a recognition that divorce courts should exert themselves to vindi-
cate the legitimate expectations of both parties with regard to pension plan
interests earned or accrued during the marriage. 91
In summary, the unique characteristics of marital disputes and of pension
plan interests should be considered in determining whether plan interests
are property as that term is used in IMDMA. The well-established and
unique continuing supervisory role of divorce courts and the underlying pur-
poses of IMDMA also should be considered. It is submitted that these ob-
servations result in the recognition of all accrued or earned private pension
plan interests as property as between husband and wife in the context of a
marriage dissolution proceeding.
89. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 102(4) (1977).
91. Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972):
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an
abstract need or desire for it. He [or she] must have more than a unilateral expecta-
tion of it. It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those
claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbi-
trarily undermined.
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they
are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings
that stein from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.
Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
As between husband and wife, the institutio of marital property, the purposes of IMDMA,
the role of divorce courts, and marriage itself surely create much more than unilateral expecta-
tions of a sharing in the value of pension plan interests.
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There is another approach to this question. It is to recognize that private
pension plans complying with ERISA are contractual in nature; they create
in employees enforceable entitlements of various types during the employ-
mient relationship; these enforceable entitlements are themselves either
property or an interest in property, and plan interests therefore constitute
"property" as the term is used in IMDMA. 92
It is tempting to label accrued but nonvested plan interests as a "mere"
expectancy and therefore not property. 93 The California Supreme Court
92. See F. CHILDS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 1-2 (1914) [hereinaf-
ter cited as CHILDS]. See also id. § 53, at 54-56.
Choses in Action, under the modern signification, can be divided into six general
classes as follows:
II. The intangible right to enforce a claim against another. This includes-
A. Admitted claims.
1. Before the time of performance has arrived.
2. After the time of performance has arrived.
3. Disputed claims.
Class II. The right to enforce claims generally, as to compel the payment of a debt,
a loan of money, rent, a mortgage, a deposit in bank, judgment, or a legacy. This
right is not the same before maturity as it is afterwards, as after maturity the owner
has a right of immediate action against the other party which he [or she] did not
have before, yet before maturity his [or her] right was property which he [or she]
could assign. Claims arising from torts are choses in action, as well as those arising
under contracts.
93. Childs also suggests that property consists of two separate concepts: "something owned"
and "ownership." Id. See note 92 supra. In the context of pension plan interests, these two
concepts of property can be expressed as alternative formal approaches to the issue of whether
such interests are property: are they interests "in property" (in something that is owned and is
itself property); or are they "property interests" (ownership interests)? ERISA's strict funding
standards, see [19791 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 3301, 3305, are a strong guarantee that the
plan's assets, which are purchased with employee or employer contributions, are valuable items
such as stock, insurance contracts, or cash. These items obviously are property. Thus, an
employee's interest in the plan is property in the sense that it is an interest "in property" or in
something owned.
Whether the employee's interest is a "property interest" or an ownership interest is a more
difficult question. Certainty and immediate availability at the employee's option are characteris-
tics of a mature and vested interest in plan benefits. Certainty alone is characteristic of a vested
but not mature interest in plan benefits, because payment is deferred. An accrued interest in
plan benefits that is accrued or earned but not mature or vested does not offer that certainty
and it is problematic to term such an interest as an ownership interest in plan assets. Yet an
accrued but nonvested interest is a claim of sorts on the assets of the plan. It is a contingent
right to some specified, measured amount of those assets, because ERISA requires that a cov-
ered plan provide that benefits accrue or are earned during the employment. For defined
benefit plans, ERISA requires that the benefit available at retirement accrue over the period of
employment at a rate that satisfies one of three criteria. For defined contribution plans, the
accrued benefit is the amount credited to the individual employee's account. See note 88 supra.
The rate of accrual may be measured by compensation or by years of service or both, but there
must be a specific rate of accrual in the plans terms, and there is then an entitlement to a
specific rate and measure of accrued benefits or interest in benefits. Moreover, the accrual
requirements make it possible to identify the time when particular benefits have accrued or
been earned by the employee. See notes 1.38-145 and accompanying text infra.
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initially took this approach in French v. French,94 refusing to recognize non-
vested plan interests as property in divorce proceedings. In the 1976 case of
In re Marriage of Brown,95 however, the California Supreme Court over-
ruled its decision in French v. French and declared that nonvested plan
interests also were property and subject to division in a marriage dissolution
proceeding. 96 Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the same conclu-
sion. 97
94. 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941).
95. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
96. In French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941), the California Supreme
Court held that nonvested retirement pay was merely an expectancy, not property, and there-
fore not subject to division upon dissolution of marriage. The appellate court's decision in
French, 105 P.2d 155 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940), discussed the particulars of the plan in question, and
held that the right to such pay was neither vested, earned, nor acquired during the marriage:
His right to receive any such pay is still contingent on many things and it cannot
now be known whether or not he will ever receive such pay .... [T]here was no
vested right or interest in this regard which existed at the time the judgment was
entered which was community property or which could be thus divided at that
time.
Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
As contrasted with the earlier case of Crossan v. Crossan, 35 Cal. App. 2d 39, 949 P.2d 609
(1939) (where plan allowed for withdrawal of the portion contributed by the employee to the
fund if employment discontinued before retirement, the amounts paid into the fund by the
employee were community property-a valuable right purchased with community funds and
therefore divisible), in French there was no certainty of eventual payment in any amount at the
time of dissolution. This also was the case in Williamson v. Williamson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 8, 21
Cal. Rptr. 164 (1962), where the plan did not allow withdrawals and payments were only certain
to be made upon retirement.
With the exception of Williamson, the cases between French and In re Marriage of Brown, 15
Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976), presented two types of situations in
dissolution cases to the California courts: (1) situations where pension benefits were fully "ma-
tured," i.e., the event upon which payment was contingent had occurred, and (2) situations
where pension benefits were "vested," i.e., where pension rights could not be reduced or arbi-
trarily withdrawn by the employer even if subject to other conditions and contingencies which
might or might not occur, but not matured.
The California cases involving matured benefits can be divided into two groups. The first
group is represented by In re Marriage of Wilson, 10 Cal. 3d 851, 519 P.2d 165, 112 Cal. Rptr.
405 (1974); In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974);
and Waite v. Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972). In each case, the
employee-spouses were already receiving monthly pension payments on benefits that had ma-
tured during the marriage. The courts had no trouble seeing these amounts as property and
thus divisible. The second group is represented by Phillipson v. Board of Administration, Public
Employees Retirement System, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970); In re
Marriage of Martin, 50 Cal. App. 3d 581, 123 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1975); Brown v. Brown, 27 Cal.
App. 3d 188, 103 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1972); Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 255 (1972). In each of these cases, the benefits were payable upon the occurrence of
events under the sole control of the employee, e.g., application for the benefits (Bensing, Phil-
lipson) or choosing to retire (Brown v. Brown, Martin). The courts hold that this type of uncer-
tainty was not that which the French rule would embrace. These pension rights were held to be
property, the courts noting that a contrary ruling would enable the employee spouse to deprive
the non-employee spouse of his or her property merely by delaying retirement.
In 1974, the California Supreme Court indicated its willingness to review the French rule in
In re Marriage of Wilson, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974). The issue
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was not decided, however, as the non-employee spouse had failed to cross appeal at the trial
court level (no doubt due to the French ruling itself). Some sentiment against French also was
expressed in In re Marriage of Peterson, 41 Cal. App. 3d 642, 115 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1974), which
is the first case that clearly held that a vested but unmatured pension right was property and
divisible. Both Wilson and Peterson underscore the inequities of the French rule. In Wilson,
two sets of pension benefits were at issue. One, a military pension, was mature. Two more
years of service were required before the pension would vest-eighteen years of service while
married counted for nought. In Peterson, some benefits were vested but not matured, and only
a few months remained to the employee's thirtieth year of service, at which point additional
benefits would have both vested and matured. If not for the fact that the plan provided some
vested but deferred benefits after five years of service, maturing if and when the employee
reached age 62, the court noted that the non-employee spouse would have been "totally
stripped of her fair share of the only substantial community asset." 41 Cal. App. 3d at 652, 115
Cal. Rptr. at 191. However, the appellate court felt bound by French and could not award any
part of the benefits that would vest and mature in only a few months. The view of vested but
unmatured benefits as property continued in In re Marriage of Bruegl, 47 Cal. App. 3d 201,
120 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1975). The court reasoned that when there is no way for rights to be
withdrawn or reduced, an irrevocable interest in the fund is created and conditions precedent
to payment relate to maturity, which does not affect the character of the pension as property
fully vested.
The moment of vesting as the sole determinative factor was directly questioned in Wilson.
For the first time, the California Supreme Court expressly held that mature pension rights
resulting from employment both before and after marriage derive from separate and community
property, respectively. Where benefits had matured during the marriage, amounts earned be-
fore the marriage were held to be separate property. The pension benefits were thus divisible
as community property to the extent earned during the marriage. This approach had been
employed without discussion in Fithian, Waite, Bensing, and Brown v. Brown. In re Marriage
of Ward, 50 Cal. App. 3d 150, 123 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1975), expanded on this approach. In Ward,
the employee spouse's benefits vested 12 days after separation but prior to final dissolution. The
benefits were held to be community property up to the time of separation, and separate prop-
erty thereafter. The Wilson court had employed time of earning rather than time of vesting to
distinguish between community and separate property as to benefits "earned" in part before
marriage. The appellate court in Ward acknowledged that even though "nonvested" during the
entire period prior to separation, the benefits earned during the marriage, once they vest, are
community property up to the separation. The California courts were thus in the position of
proclaiming that the character of benefits as separate or community depended on time of earn-
ing, even though the benefits were not property until they were vested.
In In re Marriage of Brown, 10 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976), the
California Supreme Court recognized that the French rule was untenable. The Brown court
overruled French, and held that nonvested benefits were also property subject to division. The
holding was based on contract principles, with the supreme court reasoning that because pen-
sion benefits are a form of deferred compensation for services rendered, the employee's right is
a contractual right derived from the terms of the employment contract. A contractual right is a
chose in action rather than an expectancy, and therefore a form of property. The right is ac-
quired when the employee enters upon performance of the employment contract. A nonvested
pension right, the court asserted, had been characterized in other contexts as a contractual right
and therefore a property right. Also, the French theory was rejected because it was inconsistent
with the treatment of other situations where community funds or efforts are expended to ac-
quire a conditional right to future income. 15 Cal. 3d at 847-52, 544 P.2d at 566-70, 126 Cal.
Rptr. at 638-42.
For another summary of the evolution of California doctrine from French to Brown, see
GRAY, REALLOCATION OF PROPERTY ON DIVORCE 161-65 (Oxford Professional Books 1977)
[hereinafter cited as GRAY]. See also Note, Pension Rights and Community Property: From
French to Brown, 4 W. ST. L. REV. 91, reprinted as Doyle, ERISA and the Non-Employee
Spouse's Community Interests in Retirement Pay, 4 COMM. PROP. J. 3 (1977).
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The French "expectancy" approach is untenable in terms of both doctrinal
principle and basic fairness to the parties. 98 As between parties whose dis-
pute is over the allocation of rights against a third party, it is a non sequitur
to defeat the claim of one by characterizing the right of the other vis-a-vis
the third party as an expectancy. That characterization is material to a differ-
ent controversy. 99 The nature of the spouse employee's claim to retirement
97. The leading case is undoubtedly In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838 544 P.2d 561,
126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). The first case to so hold, however, seems to have been DeRevere v.
DeRevere, 5 Wash. App. 741, 491 P.2d 249 (1971). See also Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz.
272, 569 P.2d 214 (1977); Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364, 534 P.2d 1355 (1975); Bloomer v.
Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 235 (197'8); Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 261
N.W.2d 457 (1978). Contra Yelkin v. Yelkin, 193 Neb. 789, 229 N.W.2d 59 (1975).
An Illinois appellate court recently took the same view of nonvested private plan interests. In In
re Marriage of Hunt, 78 I11. App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1st Dist. 1979), it was held that
nonvested plan interests earned during the marriage should be treated as marital property. The
court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings as to valuation and allocation
of the interests involved.
In Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975), the New Jersey Supreme Court an-
nounced its view that, where the "equitable distribution" of property acquired during the mar-
riage was concerned, "the concept of vesting should probably find no significant place . 66
N.J. at 348, 331 A.2d at 262.
In Elliot v. Elliot, __ Minn. __, 274 N.W.2d 75, 77-78 (1978) the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that pension benefits are property. The court did not distinguish between vested
and nonvested benefits. The benefits involved were vested and matured. Id. at -, 274
N.W.2d at 76. See also additional cases collected in id. at 77 n.8, most involving vested ben-
efits. See also cases collected in Annot., 94 A.L.R.3d 176 (1979). Contra, see, e.g., Yelkin v.
Yelkin, 193 Neb. 789, 229 N.W.2d 59 (1975).
Indiana courts have taken a somewhat ambivalent position, holding that even benefits that are
mature are not "a vested present interest that would allow them to be a part of a property
division." Savage v. Savage, - Ind. App. -, 374 N.E.2d 536 (1978). Cf. Goodwill v. Good-
will, __ Ind. App. -, 382 N.E.2d 720 (1978), where the Indiana appellate court, sitting en
banc, held that a pension plan is "a factor to be considered in dividing existing marital prop-
erty." Id. at -, 382 N.E.2d at 723 n.2. This position would mean that the pension plan is
significant when there is other marital property sufficient to compensate the non-employee
spouse for the loss of his or her marital share of the pension plan. Where, however, there is
little or no other marital property, a direct cash or installment award of a share of the value of
plan interests would be precluded. This approach seems unsound in that it insulates the plan
interests from being treated as property in precisely the circumstances where it is most inequi-
table to do so, that is, where the plan interest is the most substantial asset acquired during the
marriage.
98. See GRAY, supra note 96, at 161-63.
99. In an employer-employee dispute, a "mere expectancy" that benefits will be paid will be
an insufficient basis for a cause of action demanding the immediate payment of benefits. A
controversy between divorcing spouses, however, involves considerations other than the exis-
tence of eventual or immediate entitlement to benefits. The economic core of a divorce con-
troversy is a request to a court: (1) to determine present and future property and personal rights
of the parties as between themselves and (2) to supervise the vindication or satisfaction of those
rights. The surrogate powers of a trustee in bankruptcy are analogous: at the appointment stage,
the trustee simply succeeds to the bankrupt, "standing in his shoes" with regard to the debtors
of the bankrupt. It would be peculiar to suggest that the nature of the particular obligation
owed to the bankrupt was material to the appointment of a trustee, that is, to the question of
whether a trustee should be made the financial surrogate of the bankrupt. Yet this is precisely
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plan assets as against plan administrators should not be regarded as control-
ling in a divorce dispute between the spouses.
The status of the plan interest as accrued only; accrued and vested; or
accrued, mature, and vested, is relevant only to problems of present valua-
tion and to problems with regard to the desirability of particular methods for
allocating the interests involved. 100 To the extent that a right to future
benefits or a given amount of contributions has accrued or been earned by
the employee during the marriage, the present value of that amount as of
the time of dissolution should be regarded as property acquired during the
marriage. 101
Having examined the Illinois non-divorce case law dealing with retirement
plans and having introduced the general proposition that accrued or earned
benefits should be regarded as property in the divorce context, it is appro-
priate to consider Illinois cases that have involved the allocation of retirement
plan interests on divorce.
Illinois Decisions Involving Pension Plans in Divorce Context
Few Illinois cases have dealt with private pension or retirement plans in
the context of divorce litigation. All but one have involved plans not subject
to ERISA, and have been decided under pre-IMDMA divorce law.
In David v. David, 102 the trial court awarded the wife a portion of the
husband's interest in a profit-sharing plan. The First District Appellate Court
reversed. 103 Noting that the trial court had reserved the question of
alimony, the appellate court concluded that the award necessarily was made
under section 17 of the Divorce Act, which authorized an award to a spouse
of "property equitably belonging" to him or her. 104 Invoking the tangible
contribution requirement for establishing special equities, the court found no
what is suggested by the analogous notion that the nature of the employee's rights against an
employer should be dispositive of the question of whether some or all of those rights should be
allocated to the spouse of the employee.
100. There are two basic methods of allocation: (1) an immediate award of the present value
of plan interests through an award of other property having the same value; and (2) an order
that the non-employee spouse receive a specified percentage share or dollar amount of each
benefit payment made to the employee spouse. Method (2) is useful in cases where the proba-
bility of maturity, though well-estimated, is so low as to make it unreasonable to place the risk
of ultimate nonpayment solely on the employee-spouse. This approach also would recognize that
there is some premium for the non-employee spouse from immediate payment (liquidity), that
is not taken into account in an immediate allocation based on the present value of the deferred
benefit. It would seem equitable to switch from method (1) to method (2) when the probability
of maturity falls below 50%. Alternatively, the court might allow the employee spouse, as the
person most likely to feel disadvantaged by a method (1) award, to choose the type of award
made. See notes 152-56 and accompanying text infra.
101. This is the amount attributable to earnings foregone during the marriage, and it is the
amount traceable to the assets of the plan.
102. 102 I11. App. 2d 102, 243 N.E.2d 485 (1st Dist. 1968).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 106, 243 N.E.2d at 489. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 17 (repealed 1977).
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evidence that "personal funds" of the wife were used to increase the hus-
band's interest in the profit-sharing plan. 105
In the case of Busby v. Busby, 10 6 the Third District Appellate Court held
that it was proper for the trial court to include the present value of the
husband's retirement plan among the assets of the parties, and for it to
award the asset to the husband as part of the property division. 107
In Mogged v. Mogged,10 8 the Third District Appellate Court affirmed a de-
cree awarding the wife an amount equal to one-half of the value of "credit-
savings" held for the husband by his employer. The court felt no need to
consider whether the "credit-savings" were property or something else, be-
cause the award was characterized as a lump-sum in lieu of alimony 109 and
was authorized by section 18 of the Divorce Act. 110
Most recently, the First District Appellate Court, in In re Marriage of
Hunt,111 held that an employee's contractual right to an interest in a retire-
ment plan is property, regardless of whether the interest is matured, vested,
or nonvested. The trial court's division of property was vacated for consider-
ation on remand of issues of valuation and allocation of the plan interests.
David, Busby, and Mogged left open several questions regarding the
treatment of retirement plans in divorce proceedings. There was no need in
David to place either a property characterization or a value on the profit-
sharing plan because of the court's conclusion that it was neither a section 17
award (no title, no special equities) nor a section 18 award (alimony was
reserved), and that it could not be valid on any other ground. 1 12  For the
same reason, there was no need for the David court to concern itself with
the present availability of the husband's interest or with the degree of cer-
tainty that it would ever become available to the husband.
In Busby, the court assumed, without discussing the point, that the pres-
ent value of the husband's retirement plan was measured by the amount he
would receive if he resigned from his employment, and held that this value
was an asset that could be allocated as part of the property division. 1 13
Once the issue of a retirement plan's nature as property was settled, pre-
IMDMA views of the primacy of common-law title and the case law limita-
tions on special equities 114 made it doubtful that a retirement plan could
"belong" to anyone but the person with record title. Therefore, in the ab-
sence of any property right in the wife, the plan interest could only be
105. 102 111. App. 2d at 111, 243 N.E.2d at 490.
106. 11 111. App. 3d 426, 296 N.E.2d 585 (3d Dist. 1973).
107. Id. at 431, 296 N.E.2d at 588.
108. 5 III. App. 3d 581, 284 N.E.2d 663 (3d Dist. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 55 I11. 2d
221, 302 N.E.2d 293 (1973).
109. Id. at 589, 284 N.E.2d at 668.
110. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 18 (repealed 1977).
111. 78 I11. App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1st Dist. 1979).
112. 102 III. App. 2d at 110, 243 N.E.2d at 489-90.
113. 11 111. App. 3d at 431, 296 N.E.2d at 588.
114. See, e.g., Everett v. Everett, 25 III. 2d 342, 185 N.E.2d 201 (1962).
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subject to division for the benefit of the wife on an "alimony" or "in lieu of
alimony" theory. 115 This reasoning sequence led the court to view the
question of whether and how to divide the retirement plan solely from the
standpoint of need (alimony) rather than entitlement (property). So viewed,
the availability to the wife of Social Security benefits as well as periodic
alimony was dispositive, 116 and the court was relieved of any potentially
troublesome problems regarding the correct value of the plan, its precise
nature as property, and its proper allocation between the parties.
The appellate court's opinion in Mogged also presents some unresolved
problems. The approval of the account division suggests that questions not
addressed in David or Busby were here addressed and decided; yet there is
no discussion of these issues. The court avoided characterizing the award as
one of property by treating it as an award of a lump-sum of money under
section 18. Precise valuation was simple because the court selected as the
measure of value the amount in the account at the time of the order. Alloca-
tion problems were avoided by determining that a fifty-fifty division was
neither "inequitable" nor an abuse of discretion. 117 Problems with regard
to whether the asset was acquired before or during the marriage were
avoided by determining that "most" of the amounts involved were accumulated
during the marriage. 1 " Those same time-of-acquisition problems, as well as
valuation problems arising from amounts that might be acquired after the
divorce, also were unnecessary to resolve because of the court's determina-
tion that the account was to be valued as of the date of the trial court's
order. This time was chosen even though the account funds could not pres-
ently be withdrawn119 and would presumably continue to accumulate in-
terest income or otherwise appreciate beyond the date of the divorce. The
court's approach thus had the effect of denying the wife any share of a post-
divorce increase in plan assets, even though a portion of the increase would
be solely attributable to amounts placed in the account during the mar-
riage. 120
The Mogged court also avoided certain problems relating to the nature of
the plan as property. The asset involved was not immediately available, al-
though apparently it was certain to become available on the occurrence of
any one of a number of contingencies: resignation, retirement, lay-off, or
absence because of illness. 1 21  Without considering the legal consequences
of the lack of immediate availability, the court approved the trial court's
award of a "lien" that amounted to an order requiring that half the amount
115, 11 111. App. 3d at 431, 296 N.E.2d at 588.
116. Id.
117. 5 I11. App. 3d at 589, 284 N.E.2d at 668.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. IMDMA requires that the increase in value of property acquired before the marriage be
treated as non-marital property. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a)(5) (1977). By analogy, the
increase in value of property acquired during the marriage should be treated as marital prop-
erty.
121. 5 I11. App. 3d at 589, 284 N.E.2d at 668.
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in the account as of the date of the trial court's order be given to the wife
whenever the funds should become available. 122
The Mogged court showed no concern for problems relating to the en-
forcement of the trial court's order. As noted, a "lien" was placed on the
amount then in the account and the employer was "directed" to pay the wife
one-hadf of the amount "at such time as it becomes payable." 123 It was not
indicated whether the employer was a party in the trial court proceedings,
or otherwise subject to the court's jurisdiction, nor did the court indicate the
nature of the lien placed on the amount held by the employer.
Three broad principles emerge from cases decided prior to ERISA and
IMDMA. First, while it was not expressly decided whether the interests
involved are property rights or are something else, there is nothing in any of
the cases that would preclude the characterization of those interests as prop-
erty. In David, the court's use of special equities rules implies a property
characterization. The court in Busby specifically approved the inclusion of
retirement plan assets in the division of property. The imposition in Mogged
of a lien on the husband's credit-saving plan is consistent only with a view
that the amounts involved were property even though no portion of the
funds was immediately available. Nonetheless, in these cases no portion of
plan rights was allocated in a property division unless it was certain that, on
the occurrence of some employment-related contingency, a calculable
amount would become available. Only those amounts certain to come even-
tually into the hands of the employee were regarded as available for the
division. This may imply a limited concept of property, or it may imply only
an equitable or practical limitation on the types of property that could be
made subject to an apportionment to the non-employee spouse.
In Mogged, for example, the court valued the credit-savings plan as of the
date of the court's order. The amount so determined was the amount then
certain eventually to become available to the husband. But it was also the
value of the plan as of the termination of the marriage, and that sum need
not be regarded as defining all of the plan that was properly characterized as
property; it may be regarded as merely that portion of the property vulnera-
ble to appropriation by the wife. 124  Under this view, all interests created
by the plan, including future contributions to it, might be regarded as prop-
erty interests, but only those portions accumulated or earned during the
122. Id. Cf. Schwarz v. Schwarz, 27 II1. 2d 140, 188 N.E.2d 673 (1963) (award of alimony
could not be made a lien on personal property). See Lenz v. Lenz, 33 I11. App. 3d 568, 573,
337 N.E.2d 195, 199 (2d Dist. 1975), where it was stated that "the court in a divorce case has
no power to make a money decree a lien on personal property." In neither Schwarz nor Lenz,
however, was the aim of the court decree to divide the very property to which the lien at-
tached." The Mogged lien, by contrast, was designed to effectuate the conveyance of the prop-
erty itself, not merely to secure the payment of a general money decree. The account was
viewed as personal property whose conveyance could be required by the court. The lien as-
sured the conveyance in futuro of a property interest.
123. 5 II1. App. 3d at 589, 284 N.E.2d at 668.
124. In re Estate of Schwarz, 76 111. App. 2d 114, 119-20, 220 N.E.2d 889, 89.2 (4th Dist.
1966), contains dicta limiting equitable liens to specific property and precluding their applicabil-
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marriage could equitably be made available for apportionment between wife
and husband. The court's failure to consider the post-divorce increase in
value may have been unfair to the non-employee spouse, but that is not to
say that the increase could not itself be regarded as property.
Second, the possiblity was left open for a wife to establish "special equi-
ties" in a plan. This is consistent only with an identification of plan interests
as property. The requirement of tangibility and the exclusion of homemaker
services rendered the establishment of special equities factually impossible
in most cases, but this barrier arose from the definition of "special equities,"
not from a limitation on the concept of property.
Third, a plan interest could be reached by a wife through an award in
lieu of alimony. Such awards were available so long as the wife was entitled
to alimony and an award "in gross" or in lieu of alimony was equitable under
all the circumstances. 125 This was the type of award that was approved in
Mogged.
In summary, pre-ERISA, pre-IMDMA Illinois case law did not preclude,
and in Mogged had approved, the characterization of retirement plan in-
terests as property in divorce proceedings. Cases prior to the recent appel-
late court decision in Hunt thus were not inconsistent with a characterization
even of nonvested plan interests as property. The failure to award non-
vested plan interests as property in those early cases was due to policy or
equitable considerations other than a reluctance to characterize such in-
terests as property. The Hunt court was correct in declaring that earned or
accrued private plan interests should be treated as property in the context of
IMDMA proceedings. If the Hunt holding should become the settled Illinois
position, Illinois would join a sizable group of states whose courts have held
that the employees' interests in a retirement plan are property if they have
accrued or been earned under the terms of the plan.1 26  It would be un-
realistic and contrary to the modern concept of property to draw the line
between property and non-property at the point of "vesting." Moreover, to
do so in the divorce context would frequently deprive the non-employee
ity to after-acquired personalty without notice of the lien to "potential suppliers of chattels." A
notion that a Mogged lien must be similarly limited may explain the refusal in that case to make
future accretions subject to the lien.
125. See Persico v. Persico, 409 i11. 608, 100 N.E.2d 904 (1951). See also Harding v. Hard-
ing, 18 I11. App. 3d 550, 310 N.E.2d 19 (4th Dist. 1974). But see Sahs v. Sahs, 48 I11. App. 3d
610, 363 N.E.2d 156 (2d Dist. 1977), where the trial court was found to have improperly
awarded both periodic alimony and alimony in gross. Such an award was improper under pre-
IMDMA case law. See also Overton v. Overton, 6 I1. App. 3d 1086, 287 N.E.2d 47 (2d Dist.
1972). The Sahs court noted: "Furthermore, even if the trial court had not awarded periodic
alimony, it would not have been proper for it to give the wife a disparate interest in the marital
home. Such an award is proper only where special equities have been pleaded and proved." 48
Ill. App. 3d at 613, 363 N.E.2d at 158. This passage may be read as requiring that special
equities be proved in order to justify a conveyance of specific property in lieu of alimony. Such
an interpretation is flatly inconsistent with Persico. The Sahs dictum should be taken only to
mean that it would be inequitable to award a "disparate" share of the marital home to one
spouse without a showing of special equities.
126. See notes 92-97 and accompanying text supra.
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Spouse of any opportunity to share in property that was "acquired" during
the marriage. 127 Concededly, it is only after vesting that there is certainty
of eventual pay-out. It is superficially appealing to find that it is only at this
point that a property interest has come into existence. As has been noted,
however, the accrual of benefits also marks an important transition point. It
is at that point that earnings, contributions, and the employee's years of
service become transmuted into a well-defined future benefit, or, in the case
of an individual account plan, into a specific dollar amount or number of
investment units credited to the employee. This accrued benefit or contribu-
tion is concrete and well-defined, and it is traceable into a tangible property
contribution and to plan assets. It also represents an expenditure of family
time and effort that has not been otherwise accounted for or compen-
sated. 128 The accrued benefit should be regarded as property to the extent
that it is credited to the employee.
Whether to identify plan interests as marital property under IMDMA
would turn, then, on whether the interests were "acquired" during the mar-
riage.
Time of Acquisition of Retirement Plan Interests
Section 503(a) of IMDMA defines marital property as that property "ac-
quired . . . subsequent to the marriage,"129 and creates a presumption that
property is marital property if "acquired . .. after the marriage and before a
judgment of dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity." 130 Thus, it
is important to determine whether retirement plan interests have been "ac-
quired" during the marriage.
If plan interests are considered to be property because they are trace-
able to contributions earned from the employer or made by the employee, or
because their accrual and measurement are definitely specified by contrac-
tual provisions in the plan, the proposition that they are "acquired" when
they are earned or accrued is supported by the same arguments that support
the proposition that they are property. 131 If being "earned" and identifiable
constitutes the interests as property, it would seem a fortiori that those
same attributes compel the conclusion that they are then "acquired."
Moreover, the same tangibility and traceability considerations that support a
characterization of plan interests as property when earned or accrued sup-
port a conclusion that the rights are acquired when earned or accrued. For
127. See note 97 supra.
128. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 847-49, 544 P.2d 561, 566-68, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633, 638-39 (1976).
129. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(a) (1977).
130. Id. § 503(b).
131. See notes 96-97 and accompanying text supra.
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plans subject to ERISA, this time of acquisition would correspond to the
time when an employee acquired "accrued benefits."
' 132
Plan interests should be regarded as having been acquired when, under
the terms of the plan, they have "accrued." If the benefits have accrued
during the marriage, they should be treated as marital property. Their time
of accrual is the most accurate indicator of the time during which other
expenditures were foregone in order to accumulate future benefits. In the
case of a plan employing individual accounts, the interest would be acquired
when the contribution is credited to the employee's account. In the case of a
plan that does not employ individual accounts, the interest would be ac-
quired when and to the extent that the employee was allowed an accrued
benefit under the plan terms.
Plan interests that have accrued prior to the marriage or after a judgment
of legal separation should be treated as non-marital property. 133 In Musser
v. Musser,134 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District suggested
that the portion of benefits acquired during the marriage may be calculated
by constructing a fraction, with the total number of months of participation
in the plan as the denominator, and the number of months of participation
while married as the numerator:
no. of months of married fraction of present
participation value of benefits
no. of months in plan acquired during marriage
The fractional method is most accurate when the date of participation in
coverage and the date of marriage are close together. If the marriage occurs
long after coverage begins, the fractional method is less accurate. How-
ever, the errors caused tend to cancel one another. The method in effect
assumes that the amount accrued per month is the same in the early years as
it is in later years. Actually, amounts accrued per month generally increase
over time because of increasing salary and because the plan is "back-loaded,"
i.e., provides for increasing rates of accrual in later plan years. This error
disfavors the late-marrying non-employee spouse. The fractional method
ignores, however, the fact that contributions made in early years of par-
ticipation have been accumulating income longer than later contributions
and thus, other things being equal, have contributed more to the total value
of the interest than later contributions. This error favors the late-marrying
non-employee spouse.
132. See note 36 supra.
133. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 503(a)(6) (prior to marriage), 503(a)(3) (after legal
separation) (1977). Note that the increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage is
also non-marital property. Id. § 503(a)(5). This requirement makes rigorous valuation more
complex. See note 134 and accompanying text infra.
134. 70 I11. App. 3d 706, 388 N.E.2d 1289 (4th Dist. 1979). A similar fractional approach is
suggested in Hunt.
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Because the errors tend to cancel each other, the fractional method yields
a fair approximation, but one may wish, with the aid of an actuary, to calcu-
late the actual amounts accrued during each month of the marriage, together
with an estimate of amounts earned by the contributions.
Valuation
A court which is allocating accrued plan interests should attempt present
valuation 135 whenever possible. It obviously is desirable to reach the best
estimate of the amount of wealth that is represented by plan interests as a
step toward a just division.
Valuation depends in part on the type of plan involved. In a defined con-
tribution plan, employing individual accounts to which contributions are
credited, the best estimate of present value is the amount currently credited
to the employee's account. 136 An adjustment, however, must be made if
the account figure is not vested or if it is not payable when the employee
dies prior to reaching retirement age. 137 If those factors are present, then
the account balance must be discounted for the probability of vesting and for
the probability of survival to retirement. 138 Accounts containing only
employee contributions are always 100% vested. 139 Because ERISA does
not permit forfeiture of vested employee contributions, 140 such an account
need not be discounted for either vesting or survival probability.
For the same employee's employer-contributions account, the computation
is more complex. Depending on the plan terms, survival probability, as well
as the probability of vesting, may be relevant. ERISA will dictate that some
proportion of the account is vested, according to years of service and
135. ERISA defines "'present value" as follows: "The term 'present value,' with respect to a
liability means the value adjusted to reflect anticipated events." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(27) (1976).
136. See Projector, Valuation of Retirement Benefits in Marriage Dissolution, 50 L.A.B.
BULL. 229, 230-31 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Projector].
137. As noted, ERISA precludes forfeiture of accrued benefits from employee contributions if
the employee dies prior to retirement. These accrued benefits must in all events be paid to a
beneficiary or to the employee's estate. Once benefits are in pay status, however, the plan may
provide for termination of payments on death (subject to the provisions for joint and survivior
annuities). Benefits derived from employer contributions may, but need not, be treated by a
plan as forfeitable to the extent the accrued benefit has not been paid or distributed to the
employee prior to his or her death. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-4(b) (1978); 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(3)(A)
(1976); I.R.C. § 1.411(a)(3)(A). Such benefits, however, cannot be forfeited if the benefit must
be paid because of the operation of the joint and survivor provisions of ERISA. See I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(11); 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1976).
138. Projector, supra note 136, at 233-37.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(1) (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a)(1).
140. Id. Assume that X participates in a defined contribution plan with separate individual
accounts for employee and employer contributions. Assume also that (1) the retirement age is
65, (2) X became employed at 55 and is now 62, (3) X's employee account is credited with
$10,000.00 in vested contributions, and (4) X's employer-contributed account is credited with
$5000.00 in non-vested contributions. The present value of the employee account is $10,000.
The probability of survival to retirement need not be considered and the probability of vesting
is necessarily one (i.e., it is certain).
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perhaps according to age at employment. 141 For both the vested and non-
vested portions of this account, the computation of present value must factor
in the possibility of forfeiture (if the plan provides for such forfeiture) should
the employee die prior to pay-out of the benefits. For the nonvested por-
tion, the employer account must be discounted for the vesting probability as
well. That probability cannot be obtained from a well-accepted and settled
source such as a life insurance mortality table. Vesting depends on continued
employment with the same employer. The probability of continued employ-
ment might be obtained by an examination of past experience in the com-
pany or of past experience in the industry, 142 though such data are difficult
to obtain.
For defined benefit plans the computation involves additional variables.
These programs promise a future benefit. The plan spells out a method for
computing the future monthly or annual benefits that, as of a given time,
have accrued to the employee, usually according to years of service and
some measure of average compensation. 143 To the extent that the plan is
actuarially sound, it will pay that benefit to the employee from retirement
until death. 144 Thus there exists, as of the date of divorce, an ascertainable,
actuarially determined, future lump-sum that will become payable until
death to the employee (usually in monthly installments) on his or her re-
tirement. The present value of this future sum is actuarially calculable. The
variables of survival probability (for employer contributions) and vesting
141. 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1976); I.R.C. § 411(a).
142. See Projector, supra note 136, at 235-37. Occasionally the probability can be estimated
from common sense. The probability of non-vesting is nearly zero (absent bad faith by employer
or employee) for a 64 1/2 year old employee whose employer contributions will change from 0%
vested to 100% vested on his 65th birthday. But for employees whose vesting is further away in
time, the difficulties are substantial. Experience data are not usually available. Id. It has been
suggested that the probability of vesting be regarded as equal to the fraction of years completed
divided by years needed to vest. Id. Because this probability is not based on any prior fre-
quency experience, it is a "subjective" probability and statistically suspect. See M. BALMER,
PRINCIPLES OF STATISTICS 6-8 (1979). Where experience data is not available, however, the
approach may be useful. If this approach is applied to the employee in the earlier example, note
140 supra, who has seven years of service and whose entire non-vested (employer contributed)
portion of the account will become 100% vested after 10 years of service, the probability of
vesting would be years of service 7
- - .70.
total years needed to vest 10
The present value of the nonvested portion of the employer account is .70 x the nonvested
amount in the employer account, multiplied again by the probability of survival to retirement.
If the non-vested portion of the account contains $5,000.00, the probability of survival to re-
tirement (from a mortality table) is .85, and if forfeiture occurs when the employee dies prior to
retirement, then the present value of the employee's interest in the employer account is
$2,975.00 (.70 x .85 x $5,000.00), discounting for both survival and vesting.
143, MAMORSKY, supra note 7, at 6-9.
144. One of the most common forms of payment is a single life annuity. The plan may, of
course, provide for other modes of payment; ERISA then requires actuarial equivalence with
the single life annuity. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.411(c)-I. See also [1979] PENS. PLAN
GUIDE 3101-3120; Rev. Rul. 76-47; 1976-7 I.R.B., reprinted in [1979] 4 PENS. PLAN
GUIDE (CCH) 19,403.
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probability again must be considered to obtain the present value. Because
the accrued benefit is, by definition, the periodic amount payable from the
fiture value of accumulated plan funds, an additional factor is, however,
present. The amount of the predicted benefit rests on an actuarial assump-
tion that plan funds will enjoy some average annual rate of return. Thus, an
assumed annual interest rate must be used as the basis for discounting the
fiture value of accrued benefits to their present value. 145  The discount rate
chosen will yield the sum of money which, if invested at the rate chosen,
with interest compounded for the years remaining to retirement, would ap-
preciate to the amount necessary to provide the accrued benefits. Once this
sum of money is calculated, the factors discussed above relating to probabil-
ity of vesting and probability of survival to retirement are applied, as appro-
priate, to estimate present value. 146
Another approach to valuing defined benefit plan interests would be to
adopt ERISA's own methods for computing the present value of plan ben-
efits. One of the innovations of the Act is the creation of the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). 147 The PBGC is an insurer for the payment
of benefits in the event of termination of a plan subject to ERISA. It is
PBGC's statutory obligation to calculate the present value of benefits payable
under a terminated defined benefit plan. 148 The PBGC has promulgated
regulations prescribing in detail the actuarial methods and assumptions to be
employed in valuing benefits accrued under a defined benefit plan. 149 The
methods prescribed are complex, and the interest rate assumptions
employed have been questioned. 150 Nonetheless, the methods are well-
specified, actuarially sophisticated, and probably the single most defensible
145. If there are explicit rate of return assumptions in the plan document, that interest rate
may be chosen. An alternative is to look at the actual income experience of the plan. In times of
greater interest rate stability, this approach may be preferable as plan assumptions are likely to
be conservative. A third approach would be simply to choose a traditional discount rate, com-
monly 6%. In today's monetary climate, this approach has little to recommend it. Finally, one
may employ the discount rate prescribed by regulations promulgated under ERISA itself. The
interest rate presently prescribed for valuation of matured ("immediate") annuities is 7.5%. See
29 C.F.R. app. B § 2610, (1978), as amended by 44 Fed. Reg. 42180 (1979). This interest rate is
employed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to value mature or "im-
mediate" annuities for plans terminating between Sept. 1, 1978, and March 1, 1979. See note
152 and accompanying text infra.
146. See Projector, supra note 136. For purposes of this computation, the date of divorce is
treated as the date of separation from employment. This assumption has the effect of denying
the non-employee spouse a share of benefits accruing from subsequent employment. If the plan
is fair to the separating employee, it will thus also yield a fair result for the spouse.
147. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1381 (1976).
148. Id. §§ 1322(b)(4)(A), 1344, 1362(b)(1)(A).
149. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2610.1-2610.10 & appendices (1978). In effect, the PBGC regulations esti-
mate the present value of plan benefits on the assumption that they are payable as annuities.
Id. § 2605.4. Methods are specified for the valuation of "immediate" annuities, id. § 2610.5
and for "deferred" annuities, id. § 2610.6.
150. See 41 Fed. Reg. 48484 (1976), reprinted in [1979] 3 PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 15,
620A.
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uniform methodology for calculating the present value of an interest in a
defined benefit plan. The PBGC regulations do not, however, take into ac-
count the probability of vesting. 151 Thus, use of the approach for nonvested
benefits would involve computing the present value of accrued benefits
under the PBGC assumptions, then multiplying this value by the probability
of vesting. 152
In any divorce case involving valuation at pension plan interests, the pru-
dent attorney should consult an actuary as well as an attorney knowledgeable
in the pension field. Particularly where a defined benefit plan is involved,
the aid of an expert is essential. Once the courts have determined the broad
methods and acceptable sources of assumptions to be employed in valuation,
it may be expected that parties will be able to stipulate to the present value
of plan interests.
It is desirable in most cases to reach an estimate of present value. This
estimate permits the court to define more precisely the value of all assets
acquired during the marriage. It may also permit the immediate allocation of
assets in a way that will minimize the need for the former spouses' con-
tinued intrusion into each other's economic activities, and thus reduce the
potential for friction and continued litigation.
If there is sufficient marital property other than plan interests, the non-
employee spouse's share of the present value of plan rights may be allocated
to the non-employee spouse in the form of an offsetting award of other,
immediately available marital property, leaving the employee spouse fully
entitled to the plan benefits. This method offers the advantages of: (1) end-
ing the litigation; (2) avoiding continued judicial supervision and the poten-
tial for awkward judicial interference in benefit payments and plan adminis-
tration; and (3) in general, sparing husband and wife continued entanglement
151. Because the PBGC guarantees only vested (non-forfeitable) accrued benefits, the regula-
tions are not concerned with the probability that accrued benefits will become vested.
152. The rigorous use of the methods set out in 29 C.F.R. § 2610 (1978) would involve: (1)
construction of a mortality table using probabilities set out in § 2610, appendix A; (2) computa-
tion of the value of a mature accrued benefit as of the time it commences, using the appropriate
equation for immediate (mature) annuities found at id. § 2610.5; (3) computation of the present
value of non-mature (deferred) benefits by using the appropriate equation from id.§ 2610.6
for the valuation of deferred annuities (this involves applying to the mature value of the accrued
benefit a factor that takes into account both mortality and currently projected fluctuations in the
interest rate); and finally (4) multiplication of the figure from (2) or (3), as appropriate, by the
assumed probability that benefits accrued as of the date of valuation will vest.
It should be noted that appendix C of 29 C.F.R. § 2610 (1978) contains illustrative benefit
valuation results for deferred and immediate annuities, calculated on the basis of interest rate
and mortality assumptions employed by PBGC as of Sept. 15, 1974. PBGC periodically revises
its interest rate assumptions on the basis of market survey data. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Beg. 10398
(1979).
All plans subject to ERISA are required to file an "Annual Return/Report," I.R.S. Form 5500.
For plan years beginning in 1979, most plans with 100 or more participants must file, in addi-
tion, a document, "Schedule B," which contains specific "actuarial information," including: (1)
present value (aggregate) of vested benefits; (2) present value (aggregate) of non-vested accrued
benefits; and (3) information regarding the actuarial assumptions used in computing the present
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in each other's lives. The California Supreme Court employed such a
method of allocation with approval in In re Marriage of Milhan. 153
Occasionally, however, present valuation with immediate allocation is
simply too complex, or is otherwise undersirable or impractical. As the
California Supreme Court suggested in Brotwn, "if the court concludes that
because of uncertainties affecting the vesting or maturation of the pension
that [sic] it should not attempt to divide the present value of pension rights,
it can instead award each spouse an appropriate portion of each pension
payment as it is paid." 154
This "wait-and-see" allocation avoids the troublesome speculativeness and
the cumbersome calculations involved in estimating a present value for re-
tirement plan rights. It has some disadvantages as well, however. The par-
ties' economic affairs remain intertwined. The non-employee spouse retains a
strong interest in assuring that vesting and maturation will take place. Con-
versely, the employee spouse has an added degree of control over the
economic fate of the non-employee spouse. The vesting of the plan rights, as
well as their time of maturation, is wholly or partly under the control of the
employee spouse, and to that extent, the non-employee spouse's share of
this wealth is wholly or partially extinguishable at the whim of the employee
spouse. While in most cases it would be irrational for the employee to resign
prior to vesting solely to deprive the other of benefits, divorcing spouses
are not immune from such impulses. In addition, to some extent, the
employee's incentive to continue employment may be reduced by awareness
that a fraction of his or her ultimate benefits will be taken. This disincentive
is, of course, irrational, because if the award is properly calculated, no ben-
efits earned after the marriage are affected, and no wealth will be "taken"
that would not have been "taken" by the non-employee spouse in some fash-
ion regardless of which allocation method was chosen.
Any order that affects benefits as they are paid has the potential for en-
tangling plan administrators themselves in future litigation. If the order is
directed only to the spouse, there is a danger that he or she will refuse to
value of accrued benefits. This document is available for public inspection. Because it sets forth
the actual assumptions used in valuation of an ongoing plan's benefits, it is the best foundation
for accurate valuation of a participant's interest. See [1979] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 22,528
(introductory material for Revised Schedule B of I.R.S. Form 5500, from 44 Fed. Reg. 5440
(1979)). See also [1979] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 5542A (reproducing Revised Schedule B
and Instructions).
153. 13 Cal. 3d 129, 133, 528 P.2d 1145, 1147, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809, 811 (1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 976 (1974) (husband's retirement pay was community property subject to equal divi-
sion and the wife/plaintiff was entitled to one-half the value of the military life policy as well).
See also Bensing v. Bensing, 25 Cal. App. 3d 889, 102 Cal. Rptr. 255 (1972); In re Marriage of
Pope, 37 Colo. App. 237, 544 P.2d 639 (1975); DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wash. App. 741, 491
P.2d 249 (1971).
154. 15 Cal. 3d at 849-50, 544 P.2d at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639. See In re Marriage of
Hunt, 78 111. App. 3d at 663, 397 N.E.2d at 519, in which the court stated:
In those instances where it is difficult to place a present value on the pension or
profit sharing interest due to uncertainties regarding vesting or maturation, or when
the present value can be ascertained by the type, or lack, of other marital property
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pay. The dissatisfied non-employee spouse must then proceed against the
employee by citation for contempt' 5 5 or by judgment coupled with exe-
cution, attachment, garnishment, or citation' 56 against the employer or plan
adminstrators. The problems thus caused are the same where retirement
benefits are involved as they are when any periodic award is made in a
divorce case: continued court supervision is cumbersome; remedial devices
are either limited and archaic (garnishment, successive judgments) or
Draconian (contempt). Moreover, Illinois enforces spendthrift clauses, almost
surely preventing third-party enforcement in most situations involving plans
subject to ERISA. 157 Although the drawbacks to third-party enforcement in
and of themselves may be insurmountable, two other problems are posed by
the involvement of plan administrators, either in the original action or later
in the course of attempted enforcement. First, an adverse reaction to judicial
compulsion is common among employers. Second, and more seriously,
third-party proceedings against plan administrators may bring the state court
into collision with congressional policies embodied in ERISA. Indeed, there
is potential in ERISA for the complete insulation of retirement plan interests
from any and all claims by the non-employee spouse, whether those claims
are based on marital property division, or spousal or child support rights,
and whether plan interests are sought to be reached in the divorce proceed-
ing itself or in enforcement proceedings.
ERISA and Preemption
ERISA contains provisions that may be construed as preventing some or
all state court impingement on the allocation of retirement plan interests on
divorce. Every plan governed by the regulatory provisions of ERISA is re-
quired by section 1056(d)(1) to "provide that benefits provided under the
makes it impractical or impossible to award sufficient offsetting marital property to
the non-employee spouse, then the trial court in its discretion may award each
spouse an appropriate percentage of the pension to be paid if, as, and when the
pension becomes payable.
155. For methods of enforcing divorce decrees, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 502(e) (1977).
See also Taapken v. Taapken, 39 II1. App.3d 785, 350 N.E.2d 794 (4th Dist. 1976) (contempt
proceedings); Thomas v. Johnson, 12 I11. App. 3d 302, 297 N.E.2d 712 (2d Dist. 1973) (sale and
division of realty); McCowan v. McCowan, 324 I11. App. 520, 63 NE.2d 658 (1st Dist. 1945)
(garnishment).
156. Third-party proceedings by citation against plan administrators where the plan contains
the broad anti-transfer clause mandated by Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-13 (1978) are probably pre-
cluded by Dinwiddie v. Baumberger, 18 Ill. App. 3d 933, 310 N.E.2d 841 (1st Dist. 1974)
(judgment for alimony arrearages not enforceable by creditors' bill against trust with strict
spendthrift clause). Accord, Young v. First Nat'l Bank, 85 F. Supp. 68 (N.D. Ill. 1949) (gar-
nishment and attachment).
This barrier to third-party enforcement is a strong incentive for allocating the present value of
plan interests through an offsetting award of other property or in money installments.
157. See note 156 supra. See also discussion of anti-transfer clauses mandated by ERISA at
notes 162-63, 207-12, and accompanying text infra.
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plan may not be assigned or alienated."' 1 58  There is a parallel provision in
ERISA's amendments to the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), imposing the
same requirement as a condition for tax advantages. 159 Standing alone,
these provisions are merely a federally-imposed contract provision and a pre-
requisite for favorable tax treatment. ERISA's section 114 4(a), however, pro-
vides in addition that the regulatory provisions of ERISA "shall supersede
any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan described in [ERISA sec. 1003(a)] ... and not
exempt under [ERISA sec. 1003(b)] .... "160
In several recent cases, courts have considered the extent to which ERISA
preempts state divorce laws. 161 State divorce proceedings may impinge on
retirement plans in two ways. Either plan interests may be made the subject
of a direct award in the course of a proceeding, or a spouse may seek to
enforce an award already made by employing garnishment, citation, or other
supplementary proceedings against the plan participant or against the plan
itself. In either type of proceeding, the plan interests may be characterized
under state law as property to be divided or as funds available to satisfy an
award of maintenance or child support. There is agreement among the cases
that have decided the point that state court enforcement of alimony or child
support awards, by garnishment of private plan benefits that are matured
and in the hands of plan administrators, is not precluded by ERISA. 162
Beyond that point, however, the cases have reached conflicting results. In
Francis v. United Technologies, 163 a federal district court held that Califor-
nia's community property laws were preempted by ERISA insofar as those
laws purport to award a property interest in plan benefits to the non-
employee spouse. 164 Because Francis involved a property award, the case
is distinguishable from those that have permitted garnishment of plan ben-
efits to enforce alimony or child support awards. To the extent, however,
that the Francis holding rests on a finding that Congress intended, in
ERISA, to "effect the broadest possible preemption of state law," 165 the
Francis case suggests that an alimony or child support award based on a
consideration of the value of plan interests also would be barred, as would
enforcement of such an award by garnishment of plan funds.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976).
159. I.R.C. § 401(a)(13).
160. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976).
161. See note 162 infra.
162. See, e.g., Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979) (garnishment of pension funds
for support excepted from alienation and assignment provisions of ERISA); American Tel. & Tel.
v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978) (garnishment order for support excepted). See also M.H.
v. J.H., 93 Misc. 2d 1016, 403 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Queens Cty. Fam. Ct. 1978) (allowed payroll
deduction for child support); Cogollos v. Cogollos, 93 Misc. 2d 406, 402 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct.
1978) (allowed deduction of order against plan administrators for spousal support obligation). See
also cases cited at note 207 infra.
163. 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
164. Id. at 86.
165. Id.
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In Stone v. Stone, 166 decided in the same district as Francis, the court
reached the opposite conclusion with regard to ERISA preemption of
California community property awards. The Stone court concluded that sec-
tion 1056(d) of ERISA 16 7 was not intended to preclude state courts from
considering and dividing plan benefits as community property or from en-
forcing community property awards against the plans themselves, and found
no conflict between ERISA's objectives and California's property laws.
168
The Stone court reasoned that the interests of a non-employee spouse differ
from the interests of other potential claimants who would be affected by
section 1056(d) in two ways: (1) ERISA evinces a design to protect the family
unit, not merely the participant; and (2) non-employee spouses cannot be
protected from economic harms flowing from divorce or the employee
spouse's potential refusal to honor marital obligations unless plan benefits
can be reached. 169 In the court's view, non-marital claimants are differently
situated in that they have only themselves to blame for extending credit to a
person whose interest under the benefit plan was beyond their reach. 170
With regard to the broad preemptive effect of section 1144(a), the Stone
court found that the provision was not designed to preempt "any state law
with even the most tangential relation to ERISA."171 Having found that the
more specific prohibition of section 1056(d) was not preemptive, the court
had little difficulty in concluding that section 1144(a) should not be given any
greater preemptive effect. The questions involved seem likely to be resolved
in the near future, either by the United States Supreme Court or by con-
gressional action. 172
The uncertainty surrounding these questions was intensified by the recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hisquierdo v.
Hisquierdo. 173 The Court, in a seven-two decision, held that the Railroad
Retirement Act 174 (RRA) precluded the application of California's community
property laws to Railroad Retirement benefits. 175 The California state
courts were barred from enforcing community property awards against RRA
benefits as community property, and even from considering such benefits as
property in the course of making a compensating award of other community
166. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
167. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976).
168. 450 F. Supp. at 924-26.
169. Id. at 926-27.
170. Id. Accord Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 460 F. Supp. 978 (C.D. Cal.
1978).
171. 450 F. Supp. at 932.
172. S. 209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), would amend ERISA to require an employee pen-
sion plan subject to ERISA to comply with a court order to allocate a portion of a pension
payment to a divorced spouse for alimony or child support. See N.Y. Times, March 5, 1979,
§ 1, at 1, col. 2.
173. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
174. Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-445, 88 Stat. 1305 (codified at 45
U.S.C. §§ 231, 231a-231t (1976)) (amending, revising, and redesignating in its entirety the Rail-
road Retirement Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 399, 49 Stat. 967).
175. 439 U.S. at 590-91.
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property. 176 Thus, Hisquierdo raises serious questions regarding whether
ERISA preempts state divorce courts' allocation of retirement plan interests
as property. Because of numerous differences between ERISA and RRA, and
because of certain constitutional questions, the outcome is uncertain.
There are substantial arguments in support of the proposition that ERISA
should not be found to preempt the treatment of retirement plan interests as
property in the course of divorce proceedings, 177 Hisquierdo involved a
detailed consideration of RRA in terms of the following: its means and pur-
poses; its attention to the delineation of spousal rights; and its scope of
preemption and prohibition of transfers. In each of these respects, RRA and
ERISA are significantly different.
First, ERISA is a hybrid enactment, embodying both regulatory provisions
and separate but substantially identical provisions imposing conditions for
obtaining tax advantages. 178 The Act dictates the terms of most private re-
tirement plans, either because they are covered by its regulatory provisions,
or as a condition for granting tax advantages. By contrast, RRA is almost
identical in structure and operation with the Social Security Act. 179 It rests
squarely on the taxing and spending power. It creates an elaborate scheme
for accumulating revenue through direct taxation and then disbursing federal
funds to annuitants who qualify for retirement benefits under RRA provi-
sions. 180 Thus, ERISA regulates retirement plans; RRA is a retirement
plan. ERISA manipulates income tax deductions and deferrals in order to
encourage formation of and participation in private retirement plans that
amass private wealth. 181 RRA taxes employers and employees and dis-
176. Id. at 586-90.
177. Even if Hisquierdo does presage a finding that ERISA explicitly or implicitly pre-empts
California community property awards, at least two approaches remain supporting a finding of
no preemption with regard to an Illinois award under IMDMA: (1) marital property division
under IMDMA may differ sufficiently from community property awards to justify a finding of no
preemption; (2) IMDMA awards of marital property in lieu of or in addition to maintenance (see
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 503(c)(9) (1977)), IMDMA maintenance, and IMDMA child support
awards may not be preempted because of either differences in the statutory criteria involved
and their underlying purpose, or a finding of implicit congressional acquiescence to such
awards. For the maintenance criteria of IMDMA, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 504 (1977). For
a discussion of implied congressional acquiescence, see Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 660
(1950). Cf Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 587. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 459, 462 (1976),
expressly allowing garnishment of federal benefit programs for spousal and child support. See
the critical discussion of some of the problems involved in that distinction in Stone v. Stone,
450 F. Supp. at 926-31.
178. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1144 (1976) (regulatory provision), with amendments to the
I.R.C.'codified at scattered locations in 26 U.S.C. §§ 401-415 (1976).
179. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 573-77.
180. Id.
181. See H.R. REP. No. 93-553, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 4639, 4640 (Report of Comm. on Educ. and Labor);- H.R. REP. No. 93-
807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4670,
4671, 4678-81 (Report of Comm. on Ways and Means); S. REP. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4890, 4898-99 (Report of
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burses federal funds from the Railroad Retirement Account, an account that
has received transfers of Social Security funds, and is expected to receive
general tax revenues. 182 ERISA dictates the terms of private contractual
obligations and grants a private cause of action for enforcement of those obli-
gations by participants and their beneficiaries. 183 RRA sets up a Railroad
Retirement Board to determine entitlement to benefits, and provides only
limited review of the Board's decision. 184
Second, the acts differ in their textual concern for the delineation of
spousal rights. ERISA does evince some limited congressional concern for
the interaction between ERISA-protected employee rights and the claims of
non-employee spouses. ERISA requires that, for plans providing for pay-
ment of benefits in the form of an annuity, the plan must provide that pay-
ments be made on a joint and survivor basis, that is, in the form of an
annuity payable during the joint lives of the employee and his or her
spouse. 185 The plan must permit the employee to elect not to receive the
annuity as a joint and survivor benefit on reaching normal retirement age
and the employee must be able to assure a survivor annuity for his or her
spouse if the employee may retire early but declines to do so. 186 ERISA
provisions regarding Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA) deal with surviv-
ing spouses as measuring lives for distribution. These same IRA provisions
also provide for the effectuation and nontaxability of IRA transfers made in-
cident to a divorce, 187 and require that the IRA provisions be "applied with-
out regard to any community property laws."'
88
RRA's spousal provisions are more explicit and far-reaching. The Act
states: "The entitlement of a spouse of an individual to an annuity ...shall
end on the last day of the month preceding the month in which (A) the
spouse or the individual dies, [or] (B) the spouse and the individual are
absolutely divorced. ... 189 The Court noted in Hisquierdo that this sec-
tion was adopted after rejection of a proposal that would have granted a
divorced spouse a special benefit like that available under the Social Security
Act. 190 The above RRA provision was then considered by the Court, to-
gether with the preemption and antigarnishment, antianticipation require-
ments of RRA's section 231m, to reach the conclusion that section 231m was
Comm. on Finance). See also Statement of Hon. Al Ullman, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in
[1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5166.
182. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 575, citing H.R. Doc. No. 92-350, and Skolnik,
Restructuring the Railroad Retirement System, 38 Soc. SEC. BULL. 23 (No. 4, 1975).
183. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1976).
184. 45 U.S.C. §§ 231f-231g (1976). See id. § 355.
185. 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1976); I.R.C. § 401(11). See Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-(11) (1978) (espe-
cially id. § 1.401(a)-11(b)(2)).
186. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-11(c) (1978). See also Roth, Analysis of the Recent Proposed Regu-
lations on Joint and Survivor Annuities, 45 J. TAx 178 (1976).
187. I.R.C. §§ 408(a), 408(b), 408(d)(6).
188. Id. § 408(g).
189. 45 U.S.C. § 231d(c)(3) (1976).
190. 439 U.S. at 585.
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meant to assure that no RRA funds will be paid to a divorced spouse. 191
Congressional intent of comparable clarity does not emerge from ERISA.
The joint and survivor requirements may fairly be regarded as protecting
only the entitlement of surviving spouses to a continuation of benefits. There
is no mention at all of divorcing or divorced spouses. The IRA provisions
assume that an individual retirement account or annuity mnay be transferred
to a spouse as part of a divorce settlement. 192 It would be odd to conclude
that Congress contemplated that only IRAs, of all the private retirement
arrangements regulated by ERISA, could be subjected to state divorce
decrees. Moreover, the IRA provisions deal only with the tax treatment of
such transfers, and it may be that Congress regarded the tax treatment on
divorce of other types of retirement interests as sufficiently well-settled that
explicit attention was not warranted. The textual preemption of community
property laws by the IRA tax provision 193 does indicate that Congress speaks
clearly when it wishes to assure preemption of a specific matter. Even here,
however, the intent may only have been to assure that IRAs could be
created and would be taxed without regard to community property laws.
Third, as to the explicit scope of the RRA and ERISA preemption provi-
sions, again there are notable differences. The preemption of RRA is ac-
complished by section 231m:
Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, or of any State, ter-
ritory, or the District of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental annuity
shall be assignable or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment
or other legal process under any circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the
payment thereof be anticipated . . . .
The comparable ERISA provision is section 1144(a):
[T]he provisions of this [regulatory] sub-chapter and sub-chapter IV of this
chapter [Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation] shall supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan .... 195
The RRA provision aims unmistakably to preempt state laws to the extent
necessary to prevent all transfers of benefits-some normally voluntary,
some normally involuntary. It prevents the transfers and overrides contrary
state law in the same breath. The ERISA preemption provision is broad
and general, but it does not, even when read with ERISA's antitransfer pro-
visions, obviously preempt all state laws regarding involuntary transfers of
plan interests. ERISA's specific antitransfer provisions are found in two loca-
tions. In the regulatory title, section 1056(d)(1) requires each covered plan to
"provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alien-
191. Id. at 588-91.
192. See notes 187 & 188 supra.
193. I.R.C. § 408(g).
194. 45 U.S.C. § 231m (1976).
195. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1976).
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ated."1 96 A parallel provision 197 imposes an identical requirement as a con-
dition of qualification for tax advantages. These provisions, on their face,
merely require inclusion of the relevant clause. The sanction for non-
compliance is disqualification from tax advantage198 or possible injunctive
action to require the insertion of the clause. 199 Moreover, it is only as-
signment and alienation that are prohibited. The plain and ordinary meaning
of these terms embraces only voluntary transfers. There is no mention of
attachment, garnishment, or other types of involuntary transfers. The lan-
guage of ERISA's preemption provision 2 0 0 is neither limited nor textually
linked to the requirements of the antiassignment provision. 201 Preemption
extends to all state laws "relat[ing] to" retirement plans. When the two pro-
visions are read together, it is not apparent that the antiassignment provision
broadly preempts any state laws addressing assignment and alienation other
than those that forbid antiassignment or antialienation clauses in retirement
plans. In summary, the explicit preemption of RRA is more specific and
more clearly related to a prevention of all benefit transfers than is the case
for the comparable provisions of ERISA.
With regard to the broad preemption of section 1144(a), it has been ob-
served that a literal application of the provision would result in preemption
of state laws that impinge on retirement plans and plan interests in ways that
are clearly unrelated to ERISA's goals and purposes.2 0 2  It is submitted that
section 1144(a) was intended only to result in preemption of state laws that
are similar to the provisions of ERISA in subject matter and in purpose, and
that IMDMA and other state laws relating to property division on divorce
are tangential to the subject matter and the purpose of ERISA.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that there are important differences
in the scope and purpose of explicit congressional preemption in the two
statutes. Hisquierdo also rests, however, on a discerned implicit preemption.
The supersession of California's community property laws was regarded as
flowing in part from a finding that RRA evinced congressional objectives, the
accomplishment of which would be frustrated by California law. 203 The goal
of Congress was to assure that RRA funds would be paid only to the annui-
tant, and the antitransfer provisions protected the accomplishment of that
196. Id. § 1056(d)(1).
197. I.R.C. § 401(a)(13).
198. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1976).199. Id. §§ l132(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), (b).
200. Id. §1144(a).
201. Id. §1056(d)(1).
202. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 932 (N.D. Cal. 1978). See Perva Indus., Inc. v.
Connecticut Comm'n on Human Rights, 19 EMPL. PRtc. DEC. 9055 (CCH) (D. Conn. 1978);
[1979] PENS. PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 22,537 (ERISA preempts antidiscrimination statute); Na-
tional Carriers' Conf. Comm'n v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1978); [1979] PENS.
PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 22,661 (state tax on benefits preempted). Contra, Bucyrus-Erie Co. v.
Department of Indus., 599 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1979) (antidiscrimination law not preempted by
ERISA).
203. 439 U.S. at 585-91.
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goal. 20 Do the ERISA antiassignment provisions protect a similar congres-
sional goal whose accomplishment would be frustrated by treating plan in-
terests as property as between divorcing spouses, or by reaching plan ben-
efits in the hands of plan administrators for the purpose of enforcing a
division of property? ERISA's silence with respect to regulation of the rights
of divorcing spouses is persuasive evidence that there was no such goal.
Because the area of domestic -relations is traditionally subject only to state
regulation, courts are reluctant to infer congressional preemption in the ab-
sence of an unambiguous showing of preemptive intent or frustration of con-
gressional objectives. 205
It is arguable, however, that implicit preemption may flow from the
ERISA antiassignment provisions coupled with the stated objectives of protect-
ing the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their ben-
eficiaries. This position rests on the assumption that an involuntary transfer
of plan interests on divorce is an assignment or alienation. The Act does not
define either assignment or alienation, and there is little or no guidance
from the legislative history. The context and the ordinary meaning of the
terms suggest the interpretation that the intent was to limit only voluntary
transfers. 206 A few cases have so held, permitting involuntary garnishment
or attachment of plan benefits. 207 If this reading is correct, then the provi-
sions would not protect against the direct and involuntary allocation of ben-
efits on divorce. Moreover, there is doubt whether Congress intended to
protect the interests of participants from their spouses. Again, the silence of
the Act with regard to spousal rights contrasts strikingly with the detailed
protection provided vis-a-vis the participant's employer.
204. Id. at 583-84.
205. In Hisquierdo, the Court stated:
On the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict with a federal
statute, this Court has limited a review under the Supremacy Clause to a determi-
nation whether Congress has "positively required by direct enactment" that state
law be pre-empted [citations omitted]. . .. A mere conflict in words is not suffi-
cient. State family and family-property law must do "'major damage" to "clear and
substantial" federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand that State
law be overridden [citations omitted].
439 U.S. at 581. Cf. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978) (invalidated state
law which conflicted with pilotage requirements of federal law); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (sections of California Administrative Code preempted by Federal Meat
Inspection Act). See also Reppy, Community and Separate Interests in Pensions and Social
Security Benefits After Marriage of Brown and ERISA, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 417, 483-86 [here-
inafter cited as Reppyl.
206. The exceptions to the statutory provision are: (1) a voluntary and irrevocable assignment
of no more than 10% of matured benefits; and (2) use of benenfits as collateral for specified
types of loans from plan funds. To say that garnishment is not a voluntary assignment or aliena-
tion begs the question of whether it is any sort of assignment or alienation. Cf. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401(a)(13)(d) (1978); H. REP. No. 93-1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 280; [1979] 1 PENS. PLAN. GUIDE
(CCH) 2533.
207. See, e.g., Feingut v. Feingut, 47 U.S.L.W. 2531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 1979); National
Bank of N. Amer. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 93 Misc. 2d 590, 400 N.Y.S.2d 482
(Sup. Ct. 1977). Cf Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); American Tel. & Tel. v.
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It also is matter for debate whether ERISA's antiassignment provisions pre-
clude consideration of the value of plan interests followed by an indirect or
offsetting award of property equal in value to a fraction of the plan interests.
In Hisquierdo, the Court held that the California courts were precluded
from considering the value of RRA benefits in computing the total value of
the community property to be divided, with the aim of awarding the non-
employee spouse his or her marital share out of other, immediately available
community property. 20 8  This form of division had be en approved for mili-
tary benefits in In re Marriage of Milhan. 20 9 The Court found, in His-
quierdo, that even this limited consideration of RRA benefits was precluded
by the Act, as section 231m prohibited "anticipation" of benefit pay-
ments. 210 The perceived congressional objective underlying the prohibition
of anticipation was the protection of the annuitant from deprivation through
a later failure to receive benefits. Nonreceipt might result from early death
or termination of employment, or from congressional termination of
funds. 211 Finding a congressional objective that would be frustrated by an-
ticipation, the Court concluded that California laws permitting offsetting
property awards were superseded. 212
There is no provision in ERISA prohibiting an "anticipation" of benefits.
Hisquierdo proceeds on a three-step analysis. The language of section 231m
is given its literal meaning, which the Court finds to embrace the state's
action. The Court then seeks to ascertain the congressional objective that is
protected by the language of the statute. Finally, the question is posed
whether the state's action will frustrate the attainment of the congressional
objective. 213 Where the anticipation of ERISA benefits is involved, the in-
quiry may stop at the first step. ERISA does not prohibit anticipation of
benefits under state law. It is only "assignment" or "alienation" that is pro-
hibited. 214 An offsetting property award made after valuing retirement plan
interests as part of the property acquired during the marriage is neither an
assignment nor an alienation of plan benefits. In addition, the ERISA provi-
Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979); Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Commonwealth ex rel. Magrini v. Magrini, 398 A.2d 179 (1979); [PENs. PLAN.
GUIDE (CCH) 22,517; (implied exception for alimony and child support). But see Fran-
cis v. United Technologies, 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978); General Motors v. Townsend,
468 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Mich. 1976), reported in [1979] PENS. PLAN, GUIDE (CCH) 22,862,
also reported in Pension Rep. [BNA] No. 177, at D-1 (Feb. 27, 1978); Biles v. Biles, 163 N.J.
Super. 49, 394 A.2d 153 (1978) (finding preemption of garnishment for support purposes).
208. 439 U.S. at 590-91.
209. 13 Cal. 3d 129, 538 P.2d 1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976
(1975) (military retirement benefits divisible that were vested in interest). A California appellate
court recently held that Hisquierdo required that this holding in Milhan be overruled. Milhan
v. Milhan, 97 Cal. App. 3d 41, 158 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1979).
210. 439 U.S.A. at 586-90.
211. id. at 589.
212. Id. at 590-91.
213. Id. at 588-89.
214. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976).
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sion, unlike RRA's section 231n, reveals no comparable degree of determi-
nation to effect a broad insulation of benefits from any and all types of claims
or transfers.
Nonetheless, the relevant Treasury regulation issued under section
1021(c) 2 15 expands the meaning of assignment or alienation by requiring that
a tax-qualified trust be part of a plan that "provides that benefits provided
under the plan may not be anticipated, assigned (either at law or in equity),
alienated or subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or other
legal or equitable process." 216 The statutory authority for and therefore the
validity of this regulation are questionable, as it goes well beyond the plain
language of the statute. It is doubtful whether such a gloss is "necessary or
appropriate" to implement ERISA provisions. 217 The effect of the regula-
tion is to cause the inclusion of a much broader clause in most plans than is
plainly required by ERISA. Unless "assignment" or "alienation" means "an-
ticipation," there is no reason to regard such a clause as reflecting a preemp-
tive federal policy. 218 The Hisquierdo reliance on the specific "anticipation"
language of section 231n is some evidence that the Supreme Court did not
view the terms as synonymous. 219
Even if it is assumed that the language of section 1056(d) embraces antic-
ipatory awards, however, the inquiry is not at an end. The discussion of
plausible congressional objectives in Hisquierdo is properly regarded as a
dual inquiry, both to ascertain congressional intent, and also to ascertain
whether Congress was acting within the limits of its constitutional powers.
The link between prohibition of RRA anticipation and a constitutionally
permissible objective was an important issue in Hisquierdo. The conclusion
of the majority that anticipation awards were properly barred necessarily in-
volved a question of power as well as of intent. The provision was within the
powers of Congress because it was found to be rationally related to prevent-
ing results that would frustrate valid objectives of RRA. Because RRA is an
exercise of the taxing and spending power, the range of permissible objec-
tives and of permissible means for protecting them may well be greater than
would be the case for a statute resting on a different grant of power and
operating in a different way. 220 As the majority explicitly noted in
215. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(13)(d) (1978).
216. Id.
217. See 29 U.S.C. § 1135 (1976). See also 29 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (1976).
218. The Treasury regulation has no authoritative effect beyond mandating the inclusion of a
specific clause as a condition for qualifying for tax advantages. The IRS has in fact specifically
disclaimed any authority to interpret § 1056(d)(1), the regulatory antiassignment provision, or to
define the preemptive effect of § 1144, asserting that it has no authority to issue regulations
under title I of ERISA, the regulatory title. See Introductory Material preceding Treas. Reg.
1 .401(a)-13 (1978), reprinted in [1979] PENS. PLAN. GUIDE (CCH) 22,899.
219. 439 U.S. at 588-89.
220. In Hisquierdo, the Court stated that the prohibition against anticipation "preserves con-
gressional freedom to amend the Act, and so serves much the same function as the frequently
stated understanding that programs of this nature convey no future rights and so may be
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Hisquierdo, the result might well be different if a statute like ERISA were
the statute in question. In an important note, the Court stated:
In this case, Congress has granted a separate spouse's benefit, and has
terminated that benefit upon absolute divorce. Different considerations
might well apply where Congress has remained silent on the subject of
benefits for spouses, particularly when the pension program is a private
one which federal law merely regulates. See Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 [citing ERISA]. Our holding intimates no view
concerning the application of community property principles to benefits
payable under programs that possess these distinctive characteristics. 221
This characterization of ERISA may imply a recognition that RRA rests, in
contrast to ERISA, on the taxing and spending power and thus enjoys the
greater latitude of permissible means and objectives that accompanies that
grant of power. The Court also recognized, as noted above, ERISA's relative
silence as to any design to delineate or even affect the interests of spouses
on divorce. 222
In summary, although it is clear that Congress intended in ERISA to give
substantial protection to an employee vis-a-vis the employer, there is not
comparable clarity of intent to insulate the employee from spousal claims.
Certainly, such intent emerges from ERISA much less clearly than from
RRA. The structure and text of ERISA's preemption and antitransfer provi-
sions are not obviously intended to extend so far. Absent an unambiguous
congressional declaration, the Court may well find that considerations of
federalism preclude a finding of preemption of state domestic relations laws.
ERISA's regulatory purpose and the particular powers exercised also may
provide less latitute for an inference of intent to intrude so deeply into the
field of domestic relations. With regard to "anticipatory" or offsetting prop-
erty awards, the language of the relevant ERISA provision is markedly differ-
changed without taking property in violation of the Fifth Amendment [citations omitted]." Id. at
589-90 (emphasis added).
The Court has recognized that the scope of congressional power may vary with the power
asserted. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 n.17, 854 n.18 (1976). See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1975), citing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936),
and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937).
221. 439 U.S. at 590 n.24. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has stated, speaking
of footnote 24:
We read this footnote as casting no doubt on our conclusion that those seeking
enforcement of family support orders may garnish benefits regulated by ERISA, but
rather as perhaps opening the door to greater rights for spouses of pensioners cov-
ered by ERISA. In other words, we think the footnote kept the question open,
whether one may enforce the kind of community property right in the expectation
of retirement benefits held preempted in Hisquierdo against pension benefits regu-
lated by ERISA.
Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314, 317 (2d Cir. 1979) (emphasis added).
222. 439 U.S. at 590 n.24. The rationale ultimately given may, of course, be one of construc-
tion rather than of power limitation. Cf. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (resolved
ambiguity in provision of federal criminal law in favor of a narrower interpretation).
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ent from the RRA provision. Finally, the permissible scope of congressional
power to prohibit involuntary transfers and anticipatory awards may be nar-
rower where the statute "merely regulates" private plans than is the case
where the statute is designed to control the disposition of federal funds.
It has also been suggested that an exercise of congressional power which
deprives a non-employee spouse of an interest that state courts would recog-
nize as property would work a taking of property in violation of the fifth
amendment. 223 This argument appears not to have been raised in
Hisquierdo. In the RRA context, it is a dubious position because of the
characterization of RRA benefits as federal funds disbursed through a statu-
tory program which, the majority insisted, created no contractual entitle-
ment. 224 The same factors are not involved in the operation of ERISA. In
fact, ERISA has exactly the opposite thrust. It mandates extensive contrac-
tual provisions and creates a civil cause of action to assure their enforceabil-
ity. ERISA preemption of spousal property awards would thus place the
courts in the ironic position of refusing to permit division of interests whose
character as property under state law might be largely the result of com-
pliance with the ERISA's provisions. It is an open question whether Con-
gress may, through an exercise of regulatory power, preclude state recogni-
tion of private property rights. Decisions that have approved the preemption
of state property laws have not involved the exercise of federal regulatory
power. 225 The statutes in those cases were assertions of direct congressional
power over federally-owned property, 226 over federal funds, 227 or over the
property of recipients of federal benefits. 228 May Congress employ the
commerce power and its power to control the modes and timing of income
taxation to preclude state recognition of property rights created by private
223. See Reppy, supra note 205, at 487-92, 505-07. Reppy also suggests that a rem-
edy tinder federal common law must be permitted to compensate a spouse whose property
was "taken" as a result of a finding of federal preemption of state property laws. Cf. Miree v.
DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 34-35 (1977) (Burger, J., concurring) (State law governs
whether plaintiffs can recover as third party beneficiaries to grant contracts between the
defendant and the Federal Aviation Administration because no rights, interests, liabilities, or
duties of the government hinged on the litigation. Burger suggested that such a rule might not
be applied. He felt that a remedy should be available tinder federal common law where needed
to decide a controversy related to established government programs.).
224. 439 U.S. at 582-83.
225. See note 226 infra.
226. In McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905), the Court held that federal law controlled the
title to public land where the United States was the grantor.
227. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950), involved the proceeds of a military life insur-
ance policy created by federal law. See Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 309 (1964) (savings
bonds); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) (savings bonds). In Hisquierdo, the Court
characterized McCune, Wissner, Yiatchos, and Free, along with Hisquierdo itself, as involving a
conflict between federal and state rules "for the allocation of a federal entitlement." 439 U.S. at
582.
228. See United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961) (state law superseded by federal
requirement that personal property of veteran dying in veterans' hospital without will or legal
heirs passes to United States). The principle of the case has potential for expansion. Id. at
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contract where no federal funds or property are involved? It may be that
preemption under such circumstances is a taking of property without just
compensation.
CONCLUSION
The Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act has given courts hearing
divorce matters the mandate to make a "just" division of all marital property. The
new statute also restricts the availability of alimony (now maintenance) on
divorce. The focus of economic controversies in dissolution proceedings is likely
to turn increasingly from a struggle over maintenance to a struggle over
property.
For many families that are undergoing divorce, the most substantial and
important disputed asset will be the interests in pension or retirement ben-
efits that have been acquired by one or both parties. It will be necessary for
Illinois courts in making a just division of marital property to decide under
what circumstances such interests are "property." As to those interests found to
be property, it also must be determined whether they are marital or non-marital
property. This involves a determination of the time when the property was
"acquired."
Most private pension and retirement plans now are regulated by the
Employees' Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Plans complying with
ERISA guarantee that an employee's plan interests will move through three
broad stages over time of employment: (1) They initially will "accrue" or be
measured as they are earned either by specified contributions, in the case of
defined contribution or by specified future benefits, in the case of defined
benefit plans; (2) the accrued or earned benefits later will vest or become
nonforfeitable although deferred in enjoyment; and (3) the vested benefits
eventually will become mature or immediately payable either on retirement
or on request.
It is submitted that Illinois courts should include as property for purposes
of marital property division all those benefits, even though not yet matured
or vested, that are accrued or have been "earned" under the terms of the
individual plan. Most courts that have considered the issue have so held.
Policy reasons can be articulated to support this approach. Among them are
the unique long-term supervisory powers of divorce courts, and the unique
characteristics and economic importance of plan interests. With regard to the
time of acquisition, it is suggested that benefits should be viewed as ac-
quired when they accrue or are earned under the terms of the plan.
The problems associated with valuation of benefits are substantial. A
number of approaches have been suggested, including the proposal that the
653-54 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the relevant statute cannot be characterized as
merely regulatory. Every veteran affected by it was the recipient of veterans' benefits.
Moreover, the purpose of the statute has been held to be "to supply greatly needed funds for
the General Post Fund, which provides recreation and other forms of enjoyment to.ex-service
men and women confined to verterans' homes and hospitals." New York v. United States, 574
F.2d 128, 131 (2d Cir. 1978) (in re Levy).
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courts borrow valuation methods embodied in ERISA itself. It is urged that
qualified actuaries should be employed as experts to aid in the process of
valuation and in the interpretation of complex plan terms.
Three approaches to allocation are possible. The immediate division of the
present value of the plan interests is most desirable but is often not practical
for nonmature interests. An immediate award of offsetting property of the
same value is a viable method when present value can be well-estimated.
Where precise or reliable present valuation is not possible, a wait-and-see
award with fractional allocation is suggested.
Finally, the threat of congressional preemption is important to evaluate. It
is noted that ERISA's restriction on assignment and alienation may be
broadly or narrowly construed, and emphasis is placed on the sensitive is-
sues raised by congressional regulatory intrusion into the field of domestic
relations. It is suggested that ERISA should not be interpreted to deny a
non-employee spouse access to a fund which, in many cases, will be the
principal repository of marital assets.
